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The aim of this thesis is to provide a critical investigation of Charles Taylor’s political 
philosophy in light of his views on the social dynamics of individual identity. Taylors political 
contributions are motivated by the recognition that any political ideology that misrepresent 
human nature is determined to fail in realizing and sustaining its own practical 
recommendations. His philosophy is formed by the attempt to clarify the distinct nature of 
human existence and spell out terms that describes the way people act and understand 
themselves. Without the right ontology of what human beings as persons are, what a society is, 
or how the relationship between the two must be understood, the politics we advocate for, be it 
the institutions we think are necessary, valuable or just, will have little practical application or 
could end up distorting self-understandings.  
The distinction between ontological and advocatory levels of political thinking forms the 
background for his own preferred forms of politics as a criticism of ‘procedural’ models of 
liberalism that argue that the fundamental task of government is distribution of rights and 
resources based on the moral commitment of fair and equal treatment of all citizens regardless 
of their differences. Proceduralist take this commitment to involve a neutral and indifferent 
disposition towards the cultural life of citizens and insists on uniform imposition of rights that 
precludes collective goals or justifications of policy founded on cultural ideas about what 
constitutes a good life. According to Taylor, these models fail to recognize the political 
significance that follow from the fact that humans are motivated by a search for meaning and 
that as individual persons, our identity is continuously formed and shaped by social interactions. 
What this means is that it is not possible to draw clear-cut distinctions between the cultural life 
of citizens and the political procedures meant to treat all citizens fair and equally.  
Taylor thinks that a liberal-democratic model that excludes considerations of the good life as 
moral sources for political institutions, a neutral state uninformed by particular values, is not in 
accordance with how western citizens understand and experience their liberal-democratic 
arrangements, nor are such models normatively desirable. With the right ontological 
foundation, Taylor instead promotes a liberal-democratic model meant to enable citizens to 
understand and appreciate institutions as the product of their culture, history, and aspirations. 




promises, which stands or falls with its level of legal efficiency, but instead rests on shared 
understandings amongst citizens that expresses social ideals they in part recognize as extended 
aspects of their own identity. 
Taylors relationship to liberalism is not one that abandons fundamental commitment to 
universal human rights and civil liberties. The ‘communitarian’ label attributed to him, as 
someone who locates moral-political prescripts within communal domains rather than universal 
norms, overlooks the fact that his criticism of liberal theory is motivated by the aim of providing 
sustainable conditions for the proliferation of liberal-democracy. These conditions have to 
include conceptions of personal identity and social forms of self-understanding that are 
consistent with the idea of a universal core morality we can reason about. His ‘communitarian 
inspired’ politics also aims to reinvigorate what he thinks are neglected aspects of the liberal 
tradition itself. These concern conditions of social cohesion, the value of political participation 
and the social conditions of freedom. Taylor thinks that terms like freedom, as well as equality 
and justice, have been distorted by an overtly individualistic understanding of citizens as pure 
right-bearing atoms detached from one another with their own interests. In consequence, this 
view reduces the value and understanding of political arrangements as instrumental means 
towards the realization of individual interests in aggregation but overlooks the fact that some 
social goods are given meaning because they are irreducibly social. 
The classical liberal idea that common goods emerge via the invisible hand of self-centered 
individual choices neglects common goods that are only valuable because they are mutually 
pursued and appreciated in common. In this vein, Taylor challenges the notion that individual 
rights can be reduced to individuals given that upholding liberal values like freedom of speech 
and association, depend on a culture’s self-understanding that affirms the value of liberal rights 
and democracy as vital aspects of what it means to live a good, purposeful human life. This 
ought to tell us that often it is unwise to insist on imposing what we think is right into 
communities that do not have the same moral background that makes ethics intelligible. Liberal 
democracy is thus not the result of some rational procedure that we as moderns can never loose 
hold of but is closely aligned with citizens’ search for meaning and self-understanding.  
As I will show, there is an inherent logic within Taylor’s thought about the individuals sense of 




society, and public domains of deliberation. The aim of this paper is to analyze Taylor’s politics 
in relation to his own views of personal identity and his conception of the dialogical self. While 
I share Taylor’s skepticism of neutral liberalism and agree there’s good reason to take account 
of people’s self-understanding when imposing moral decrees, there exists an inconsistent 
relationship between his political philosophy and his conception of the self. Despite Taylors 
emphasis on the dialogical nature of individual identity, he goes to great lengths to emphasize 
how diverse the sources of the self of modern citizens is, which in turn gives  great moral 
authority behind the modern ideal of authenticity, which Taylor understands as the entitlement 
individuals are owed in order to live an original way of living that is true to their own identity. 
Taylor’s commitment to foster conditions that proliferate this ideal could be undermined if the 
political institutions he advocates for will stifle the plural sources of the self by imposing fixed 
views on individual identity, or creating social sentiments that exert conformist pressures that 
make it difficult for individuals to explore one’s inner depth and original sense of being. Just 
because individuals need public domains to find themselves, it is unclear to what extent the 
state should play a part in this constitution.  
Since no one but the individual can know what represents his identity in its full breath, it follows 
that the sources of what we consider valuable and good cannot be united by a singular symbol 
drawn by others. Given Taylor’s claim that a liberal-democracy depends on a democratic 
culture where people share the same understandings of democracy and political identity as a 
genuinely shared good, and the fact that  democracy tends towards implicit shaping of their 
own citizens to fit the need of social cohesion through common identity, politics might end up 
forming civil society into modes of living that is untrue to the individual identities within it. 
That being said, this does not mean that Taylor’s understanding of the role identity plays in 
politics is misguided. As I will show, there is plenty nuance in Taylor’s philosophy which shows 
that many of his critics exaggerate the supposed consequences that follow from his normative 
recommendations of what citizenship in a pluralistic society can mean. 
In order to make this argument I will first lay out the philosophical background that informs 
Taylor’s views on human agency and identity. I will then precede to place Taylor’s views in 
relation to both classical and contemporary liberalism in chapter three and go through central 
corrections to his thesis on individual identity and social belonging, as well as his depiction of 




political theory is an extended aspect of his views on modern morality and the close connection 
Taylor draws between action-guiding moral theory and an agents identity. From this I will 
contrast Taylor’s views on the role of culture in a liberal democracy with the views of Jürgen 
Habermas which serves as the final theme in order to discuss the extent to which Taylor’s views 
on culture and identity are inconsistent with his own moral commitments to the ideal of 
authenticity. In the final section I will introduce a brief discussion of the applicability of Taylors 




















2. Taylor’s philosophical agenda: Invoking culture 
Taylor’s political philosophy is part of his larger self-described ‘philosophical agenda’ to 
counter the influence of ‘naturalistic’ tendencies in social science and the humanities, by which 
he means any model inspired by the language and operatives of natural science to understand 
human beings. Validation of social theory differs from natural science, for the same reason why 
social science cannot without controversy perform prediction, given that the objects referred to 
are not constants but variables that change in accordance with human self-understanding. 
Humanity cannot be understood in objective terms that are independent of the subject’s own 
beliefs and experience since human behavior is only intelligible because humans are creatures 
that search and attribute meanings to things. In this way, actions are events that express a certain 
meaning and dissecting social life requires investigation into the significance humans attach to 
their environment, and how it is established (Taylor 1985, 2-3) 
The question of what human nature is, what makes them distinct from other creatures, and how 
humans should live, finds in Taylor an answer that emphasize human dependence on language, 
and the crucial role language plays in our ability to define our identity. It is through language 
that humans think, express itself and interact with others in ways that form their social reality 
and individual identity. Taylor argues that human beings ought therefore to be viewed as ‘self-
interpreting’ animals. This means that humans have ideas about who they are in ways that 
constitute what they are. This is because human beings have, and attribute, anthropocentric 
qualities to the material world, themselves, and others. These are the kind of qualities that the 
language of objective natural science cannot accommodate since they are subjectively 
dependent, such as a ‘beautiful mountain’ or a ‘honest person’, yet indispensable in an account 
of human nature and personhood (ibid, 46-50, 234). 
Taylor’s thesis on human agency and individual identity are closely related. The fact that human 
beings are agents, beings that can articulate goals and act towards their realization, means not 
only that we have the capacity to engage in quantitative calculations or means/end reasoning, 
but also that we have the capacity to engage in ‘strong evaluations’. What this means is that, as 
self-interpreters we see  
“ourselves against a background of […] distinctions between things which are 




This aspect of agency is our ability to critically reflect on our own desires in qualitative terms 
between the higher or lower forms of worth. The qualitative terms we employ to evaluate our 
own desires as being noble, base, worthy or cowardly and so on, is not something we have de 
novo, but is given to us through the understandings that tradition and culture have brought 
forward. Contrary to what ‘naturalistic’ models are inclined to do, these evaluations cannot be 
reduced to natural instincts or needs. They are instead expressions of our ability as agents to 
seek and attribute meaning. Strong evaluations can prompt us to make choices based on what 
we consider good, admirable, and purposeful, which intimately connects to what kind of person 
we want to be and identify as.  
The process of personal development is situated within cultures that provides concepts for self-
understanding and social interactions, whose meaning have been partially articulated by 
previous generations in ways that reflect both the universal human condition as well as a 
particular way of life by giving individuals ideas about what distinguishes the honest person 
from the deceiver, or the brave man from the coward, and a higher form of life from a lower 
form. The values we express through qualitative distinctions are articulations we use to orient 
ourselves as persons. The fact that our experience of the world as moral subjects is 
intersubjectively formed means that our capacity for agency depends on a social background 
that enable us to articulate what we consider meaningful and valuable. To be a person is to exist 
in this linguistically constituted space, where questions of what is valuable arise, and where we 
try to provide answers on what these qualitative distinctions entails, in dialogue with others and 
in our own meditations. Hence, the distinctions do not denote content but is given to us as 
frames that we can articulate and reflect upon. The moral progress that has brought forward 
modern senses of human dignity or respect, has happened through rearticulating of these 
qualitative terms through different cultural time periods. Thus, an important part of our ability 
to reflect as strong evaluators will consist of critically examining these articulations and refine 
them in concert with the goods we think they ought to refer to on the basis of our own 
experience (ibid, 16-30, 45-55). 
2.1 Strong Evaluation and Individual Identity 
Taylor’s concept of strong evaluation is an extension of Harry Frankfurt’s distinction between 




relate desires themselves as the objects of a higher desire. Human agents can critically evaluate 
their actual or lack of motivation by evaluating what they are drawn to. For example, we can 
have a second-order desire to quit being drawn to vices, or a second-order desire to be in want 
of goods we currently are not drawn to. From this Taylor posits that there are two forms of 
second-order desire. Whereas first-order desires are good in themselves, second-order desires 
are evaluated based on their strategic or moral purpose. Weak evaluations are strategic 
judgments that concern the relations between our interests without any normative scrutiny of 
their worth. When we choose a glass of wine over whiskey, the choice reflects a matter of taste 
without any significant meaning. We might enjoy whiskey as well; we just do not feel like it at 
that particular time when faced with the choice between the two. As weak-evaluators, we are 
only concerned with quantitative consistency, but as strong evaluators we are informed that 
having desires are insufficient for establishing that its normative value, which lead us to 
reconcile our choices with the values we hold (ibid, 16-20). 
Individual identity is intimately connected to strong evaluations. By refraining from acting on 
motives we consider unworthy and below our character, like revenge or spite, we see that the 
purpose of our actions is incompatible with who we are as a person. In this instance, the 
conception we have of ourselves, as a brave, just, or honest person, stems from how we define 
ourselves. Who we are, and who we want to be, attach to the values that are rendered intelligible 
through the qualitative contrast between higher and lower forms of being. Taylor claims that 
when we articulate who we are, we engage in implicit articulation of our life plans. By 
investigating our own preferences on the basis of higher ideals of what kind of life we consider 
worthy to live, and what kind of person we want to strive towards becoming, we go beyond 
merely weighing value-neutral alternatives in the weak sense of evaluation. Therefore, as I will 
soon explain in detail, morality cannot be narrowed into questions of what is right to do, for 
then we fail to elevate the strong evaluative aspect of agency which connects to a vision of the 
good life, and admirable virtues (ibid, 23-25.) 
We depend on other’s recognition, both intimately, publicly, and legally to define ourselves, 
and discover who we are by sharing our ideas about the world in mutual receptive relationships. 
The fact that human life is dialogical tell us that to become an agent in the full sense of 
understanding and forming one’s own identity takes place by listening, speaking, having 




our civilization. These things are the modes of expressions that language in the broad sense 
refer to. Though we often reflect and refine our opinions in isolation, our reflection stems from 
social interactions and cultural references. To define your identity always involves some other 
as an addressed reference, be it friends, family, an author we have never met, or God. Some of 
these conversations, like with our parents, continue in our own mind even after they have passed 
away. As singular participants within a web of interlocutress that provide us with a public 
framework of reference we make use of to articulate our judgments of worth, our moral 
development picks up on a continuous process of articulations of qualitative distinctions of the 
good life, where we interpret these ideals through our own understandings (Taylor 1991, 32-
34). 
The strong evaluations that shape our behavior is intelligible through the cultural background 
that grounds our judgments. The properties we have in terms of our capacities or social 
background are only part of our identity in that they represent 
“membership in a certain class of people whom I see marked off by certain qualities 
which I value in myself as an agent and which come to me from this background” 
(Taylor 1985, 34). 
To be a person defined by various characteristics, such as a nationality, profession, or a religion, 
are aspects of identity in that refer to his or hers background of meaning. These integral qualities 
cannot be distinguished from strong evaluations. To question their claim to truth is no simple 
process. When people have an identity crisis, they are forced to question the fundamental 
convictions that define life, and more seriously, when people  suffer forms of oppression that 
denies them the expression of their convictions they can be psychologically damaged and 
rendered unable to perform authentic judgments of worth. Our standing in a social group of 
various sorts can also constitute, depending on the meaning we ascribe to our membership, a 
significant aspect of how we understand ourselves. The meaning of our social belonging can be 
articulated how we see ourselves against others in both good and bad terms. The background 
basis of what we think is worthy of respect will vary across different cultures, which puts 
restraints on our ability of moral imagination given our dependency of a certain range of 




Strong evaluations of what we consider valuable and significant is therefore not some 
existentialist choice in vacuum from our culture since there’s only so much room for how we 
can describe the motives that guide us given that the descriptions we make use of in part 
determine our judgments. Even though the self is partially determined, Taylor does think that 
we can be held responsible for our strong evaluations, and he does not want his thesis to be 
interpreted as some form of cultural value relativism, which is often taken to mean that the 
value of a certain culture depends on contextual surroundings and that we therefore cannot 
criticize cultural-meanings from an impartial perspective. Taylor has however, been accused of 
promoting meta-ethical claims about morality, the idea that moral claims cannot enjoy universal 
status, and also for being too apologetic of cultural practices that we recognize as wrong. As I 
will discuss in more detail later, while the first accusation is false, I do think that the second 
accusation rests on partial misunderstandings of Taylor’s position. Taylor does believe in a core 
human morality that enjoys universal status, and as such humans can hold inadequate strong 
evaluation that are open to change, and which historically always have changed in ways he 
describes as ‘error-reducing’ moves, whereby continuous interpretations of the qualitative 
distinctions that give meanings to an ideal, for example ‘honor’ or ‘dignity’, leads people to see 
the ways in which their judgments of value are mistaken. Though how this change comes about 
might be difficult, since practical reasoning must proceed via common points of reference that 
both parties accept, which means that we always need to agree on some strong evaluations 
(Taylor 1995, 36). 
Therefore, the fact that we are responsible for our strong evaluation is necessary to establish 
since being hold responsible for our actions is a crucial aspect of agency. This responsibility 
depends on our possibility to re-evaluate our judgements given that we can make mistakes in 
our articulation of values, and reasonably be expected to be corrected when presented with a 
challenge on the basis of other evaluations we hold. The fact that our self-interpretations gives 
meaning to what we experience does not mean that experiences cannot change our self-
interpretation. The conceptions of the good that people hold is what makes our identity connects 
to a life story of the past, and aspirations for the future. Values that we no longer affirm are 
therefore also a part of identity to the extent that our moral development moved away from 
them and connects us to our past. The evaluations we no longer hold have influenced and help 
us better understand the moral beings we might be today with regards to what we think is good 




Taylor argues that large parts of the history of philosophy has overlooked the fact that human 
personhood, as a distinct form of agency, involves strong evaluations, which in turn has had 
moral-political consequences. The drive to quantify the mechanistic universe has excluded 
picture of human’s anthropocentric qualities and their self-evaluation, which undermines how 
the world is understood in human forms of meaning. Beyond our capacity of rational 
objectification of the world, we are also emotional beings with values that stem from the 
anthropocentric qualities of things. Our feelings rest on our experience of situations, whose 
interpretation depends on culture. What is shameful in one culture might be honorable in 
another. These feelings depend on judgments that relate to cultural meanings we have been 
given through socialization and conscience self-reflection that has conditioned us in certain 
ways due to our cultural surroundings (ibid, 48-50, 62-63).  
 The alternative accounts that posits human agency as marked by the capability of quantifiable 
and value-neutral reasoning promote essentialist fixation of human ends that are detached from 
its continuous cultural interpretation. By viewing humans as rational calculators, these 
conceptions of personhood can only distinguish humans from other intelligible animals through 
differences in the degree of strategic planning. The moral-political forms of reasoning that 
implicitly rely on this view, as we will see, have as a consequence promoted instrumental views 
on social life that undermine individual’s dependency on a cultural self-understanding in order 
to orient themselves. The temptation to adopt this view lies in the fact that it makes freedom 
easier to conceptualize, since the strategic person does not have to interpret the world in 
reflective terms to find out what he seeks and who he is, but understands his purpose as given. 
Despite this temptation, references to cultural meaning are needed to account for the fact that 
motivations are formed by self-interpretations in a dialogical interplay between individual and 
society, which poses a challenge for political philosophy on how to reconcile freedom and 
social belonging (ibid, 95-112). 
2.2 The Best Available Account 
Taylor’s view of personhood connects to his ‘principle of the best available account’ which is 
meant to tell us that the explanation of any social phenomenon must make use of the same terms 
that agents themselves can understand based on their own experience. This is necessary to 




what it means to be an agent cannot go via abstraction of her values into mere interests but must 
make use of the same term she refers to in explaining what is meaningful and valuable. To 
understand her personal identity, and the social community she might be part of, we need to 
accommodate the strong evaluations that shape people, to describe and devise normative 
recommendations for what they should do. Since persons are embedded in different cultures 
with their own ways of living, the various modes of self-understanding that takes place is 
something any descriptive theory should illuminate considering cultural differences. By 
abstraction and reduction, we fail to grasp these cultural differences, and what they could tell 
us about the human condition. Since the terms agents use to describe themselves and the world, 
through feeling such as fear, shame, pride and so on, are indispensable for how they understand 
themselves and the world, they ought to figure into a social theory to preserve the fact that 
humans are self-interpreting animals. We need subject dependent terms such as ‘justice’, 
‘dignity’, or ‘revenge’ to understand the motivations people act on, since these are qualitative 
distinctions that capture the attribution of meaning humans employ. These terms belong to a 
certain form of life and a social world that reflects meaning. This does not mean however, that 
the explanations we provide coincide with the agents own experience given that they may hold 
inadequate judgments in relation to a situation that stems from false beliefs, or unarticulated 
evaluations that can be challenged (ibid, 55-60). 
2.3 The Dialogical Self 
The modern idea that a good life is lived in accordance with what we conclude from inward 
inspection of our true self is the moral ideal that Taylor calls the ‘ethics of authenticity’, the 
idea that identity has to accord with one’s inner depth that cannot purely be externally ordered 
by social conventions. This ideal tells us that there is a way to be human that is uniquely right 
and original for each of us, and thus only the individual can discover what it consists of. In 
ancient times, this freedom to investigate ‘the self’ was untenable given the widespread belief 
that differences between individuals were of little significance and that there was a correct way 
each man ought to conduct himself in accordance with either his place in society, the dictates 
of the divine or objective accounts of human nature. This ethic informs us that all institutions, 
the established norms, values, and practices, in our social order are subject to scrutiny, and have 
to be affirmed by the people who live by them. However, the fact that we establish who we are 




recognized by others for who we are in order to construct our identity. We can only discover 
who we are and how we want to live through inward inspection by our attachment to social 
domains and cultural references. Through the medium of language, we are given qualitative 
distinctions that we interpret into our own ideals and moral frameworks and it is only through 
culturally conditioned linguistic practices, whereby we go through processes of socialization 
into norms and practices, that we access the horizons of meaning that enable individual self-
realization to take place. We need culture to affirm for ourselves what we think is significant, 
we cannot invent it. We cannot express what we consider valuable in a vacuum but have to 
build on common goods and common meanings (Taylor 1994, 27-34). 
There are several ways people can enjoy shared good, some of which are reducible to individual 
experience and some which are irreducible in that they depend on being shared. People might 
share the same beliefs or experience without depending on others to do so. The fact that a park 
is a social good that people enjoy spending time in is a function of individual sentiments, and 
hence the value of the park is an instrumental function for individual enjoyment. However, if 
the common points of reference between participants are enjoyed because there exists mutual 
recognition of each other’s participation, the function of the good cannot be reduced to the 
individual level. Friendship and nationality, for example, are only meaningful because the 
individual members recognize each other’s bond. Nationality is only meaningful because 
members share a history, language and distinct experience, the same way friendship is 
meaningful because friends know that the other appreciates his company, where the value of 
the association not an instrumental function of the individual enjoyment, but rather an intrinsic 
value conditioned on its shared nature. Both reducible and irreducible goods often depend on 
intersubjective reference points so that individuals can partake in a shared reality based on 
mutual understandings. Though people have few reference points that bind them together, there 
is always a need for common terms that allow us to communicate. The qualitative contrasts in 
language, such as justice or freedom, are intersubjective in this way because they are commonly 
known, but interpret differently (Taylor 1995, 130-145).  
The fact that we have to look within our own depths to affirm that our identity is in alignment 
with what feels right for us as individuals, have to be reconciled with the fact that we are social 
animals that discover who we are through relationships and cultural resources within human 




about the self, follows the considerations he makes in the attempt to reconcile individual 
freedom with social dependency, our sense of individuality alongside our sense of common 
civic unity. When Taylor asks whether we have any moral obligations towards the communities 
we have had no choice but to exists within, he invites us to think about ways that social 
obligations could be grounded on conceptions of freedom itself. In this way, there should be 
aspects of our social order we ought both to reform, re-invent and preserve. This is why he 
thinks that radical individualist philosophies are often self-defeating because they ignore the 
social conditions that uphold freedom. Though he recognizes that all traditions, norms, and 
practices are objects of normative scrutiny he does think that traditions, by their very existence, 
reflect aspects of the human condition. What this means is that traditions can tell us something 
about how different cultures have interpreted what it means to be human evident in the various 
forms of life that this universal has been given particular shape. As traditions have sustained 
themselves over time, they are entitled to the presumption that there could be something of 
value to be found within them, and we ought not to dismiss them before investigation the 
possible insights about humans and society that they contain (Taylor 1994, 66-67).  
However, Taylor’s assertion that there is such a thing as irreducible social goods is contested, 
as well as what he thinks ought to follow from their existence. For example, the fact that society 
is valued instrumentally is for Kukathas (1996) plausible in all the respects Taylor thinks it is 
not, because the very attachment people have to their relationships or frames of public reference 
is in the end something that is “valuable to someone for the value it gives someone” and just 
because goods depend on collective structures does not make it irreducible (ibid, 72). When 
pressed on this, Taylor would not dispute that a social good must matter for someone to be 
worthy of protection, and he does not denies the separateness of persons, the normative claim 
that each of us have our own life to life. However, he attaches significance to the fact that it is 
a life lived with others in a shared space. He thinks that goods are irreducible because the 
possibilities that are open to us as purposeful beings are only intelligible against our cultural 
background, however the significance of these social forces does not entail deterministic view 
that we can be reduced to these dynamics..  




The emphasis on strong evaluation as an intrinsic part of the phenomenology of agency is at 
times framed in ways that present agency as an ideal rather than a sociological observation. It 
invites a reading that there are certain conditions needed to foster the exercise of strong 
evaluation as a potential we all have, rather than our actual nature. When Taylor writes that a 
person without this ability, the simple weigher of alternatives, lacks “the depth we consider 
essential to humanity” (Taylor 1985, 26), Daniel Weinstock (1994) asks whether this is 
supposed to be an objective condition that all human, at a minimum, must align with in order 
to pass as a person, which would suggest that very few people are actually persons in the full 
sense given the reasonable claim that  few “people generally engage in the fairly sophisticated 
exercise in reflexive self-understanding and self-constitution which strong evaluation involves” 
(ibid, 172,174). This leaves the reader asking whether the basis of human rights lie in our actual 
practice of strong evaluation or because we have the potential to exercise it. If so it would seem 
that to be a strong evaluator in the full sense amounts instead to a normative claim that part of 
the good life consists of self-reflection, which ought to be fostered and pursued on the basis of 
favorable conditions that help us exercise our potential as humans. This follows from Taylors 
claim that when the basis of the respect we think humans are owed lies in a certain capacity, to 
recognize human rights involves an obligation to foster this capacity since “to make someone 
less capable of understanding himself, evaluating and choosing, is to deny the injunction that 
we should respect him as a person” (Taylor 1985, 100). In response to Weinstock, Taylor 
clarifies that his early writings were meant to define strong evaluation as a universal human 
potential, however to act on it does not require that we have critically reflected on the 
background of meaning that informs us, only that we can sense that some aspirations and desires 
stand in qualitive relationships to others (Taylor 1994, 249). 
Beyond this confusion within Taylor’s work, it seems problematic to link morality in the broad 
sense of what it is good to be so closely with self-identity. It seems that we lose hold of the 
claim that some things we should do are independent of whether we recognize the dictate as a 
conception of our own values. Taylor’s account makes it hard to spell out the questions of 
morality that are distinct from defining one’s identity, instead merging them together. Even if 
moral reasoning reveal aspects of our identity, does it follow that all identity questions involve 
morality and that the same reasons are employed in both domains? Intuitively, it seems that 
some questions of identity seem to be at a large distance from what I think I should do in a 




identity because there is some underlying notion of deeper meaning, the implications of this 
would blur the line between things that are important to people which we sometimes intuitively 
associate with identity. For example, it seems to suggest that one’s taste in music or literature 
only distinguishes people on the basis of identity if we can show that there are different ideals 
behind the character traits. 
This distance between intuitive understandings of identity and a person’s values, also connects 
to the strong connection Taylor draws between identity and our ability to tell a life-story, where 
we could ask the same question of whether all aspects of identity are intimate directions of 
where we are going in life. The dialogical process by which identity is constituted in relations 
to others in life are united by our ability to set out a plan and act in accordance with what we 
take to be a purposeful pursuit on the basis of our horizon of meanings. This aspect is why 
Taylor sometimes refers to identity as something that we continuously are becoming given that 
continuity is marked by choices and re-articulation of our values, which reaffirms my 
impressions that there’s an overt significance of action-guiding values that Taylor embeds in 
the concept of identity (Taylor 1989, 30-47). 
Is this need for unity via the continuous streams of meanings across the life story that is our 
identity really necessary? Lyshaug (2004) argues this is too demanding and that it instead 
should be sufficient for the self’s unity to understands its development via “minimal narratives” 
rather than an all-encompassing endeavor. In addition, she claims that there are ethical 
consequences for holding on to this life-story that leads to stifling conception of identity if 
people do not dare to challenge the narrative they have lived by and are unwilling to challenge 
the attributions of meaning they have held on to given the need to tell their story. We ought to 
recognize that people can fail in living up to their own ideals or the expectations of others, and 
that sometimes a radical distancing from the cultural frameworks that have supported the 
articulation of identity cannot be made into a story the way Taylor presents it as. Lyshaug argues 
that without this recognition, an individual that lives via the demand to tell a life-narrative might 
stifle and hinder the full expression of the dynamic self that Taylor models, and should be 
corrected via the fact that the complexity of the self might not be as significant as Taylor makes 
it out to be. There has to be ways in which one’s identity is open to accommodating features of 
its experience that do not fit the larger story since these fragments will affect our identity by 




3. Sources of liberalism 
Liberalism is a tradition of thought that seeks to spell out what follows from valuing freedom. 
As we will see, this alone is complicated by the fact that freedom is an essentially contested 
concept that is difficult to account for in neutral term given its normative implications. There 
are different ways to articulate the moral core of liberalism that grounds various understandings 
and justifications for political institutions such as individual rights, the rule of law or property 
rights. Given the fundamental equality of all human beings and the fact that individuals are the 
sole owner of their own body, there are certain things no one else are entitled to do to them, as 
the free individual is one who lives by his own dictates. Much of liberal philosophy seek to 
investigate the nature of political associations and the subsequent normative relations between 
individuals and the state. With some reservation, we could say that liberals at large share the 
belief that a just society is not one constituted by a state imposed understanding of how man 
should live, but instead one governed by a framework of law and equal citizenship amongst all 
members of society which enable individuals to pursue their own interests in accordance with 
their own beliefs and differences. The principles of justice that guide the institutions of law are 
independently valid from particular goods individuals affirm as these views are for the most 
part not necessary precursors for the establishment of the legal framework. As a political force, 
liberalism came into prominence in the 19th century alongside the rise of democratic institutions 
and new forms of commercial activity and was defended as the fitting ideology to accommodate 
the rising pluralistic mass society and the product of enlightenment ideals that promised 
individual prosperity for all amidst its diversity, so long as the state let individuals go on 
unrestricted in the self-interested pursuits where reason and instinct lead them (Pettit 1993, 
163). 
As a political philosophy, classical liberals understand the purpose of law as a baseline for 
impartial regulations and the only necessary framework needed to the coexisting pursuit of 
individual interests on the basis of their own conception of what a good and worthy life is. 
Beyond this, its purpose is usually taken to be nonexistent, and has no agenda in the shaping of 
citizens own conduct. Both Hobbes and Locke, two classical sources in the tradition, offered 
such a view.  The regulation and enforcement of law is only one part, however. In Locke’s 
model, it is emphasized that the power of the state is directed in appropriate manner and never 




of a social contract, in impartial reasons that are in theory acceptable to be shared by everyone. 
The purpose of constitutionally embedded law is to demarcate the legitimate areas of 
interference within citizens scope of conduct and constrain the use of power, accordingly, thus 
constituting order and guaranteeing equal freedom amongst citizens. Both writers were 
motivated by the concern of moral pluralism which lead them to explore the possibility of 
constructing universal criteria that could accommodate the dynamics of a diverse society, both 
domestically and internationally, to establish common ground amidst different views on man, 
God, and society1. This search for a foundational principle in social-contract theory was meant 
to capture the human necessities that all had an interest in securing for themselves that could 
serve as the axiomatic starting point of which other facts about political life could be deducted 
from. For Hobbes, this condition was articulated in the fundamental law of nature to seek peace 
and keep it, which he took to be universal human interest that serves as the precondition for 
legitimate political authority (Tuck 1994, 167-168). 
From these sources, writers in the liberal tradition has inherited the normative claim that the 
state is a distinct value-neutral sphere of influence, needed to uphold civil interests such as the 
rule of law, peaceful coexistence, and protection of property. The idea of state neutrality is often 
treated as an integral necessity of liberal government committed to justice and equal dignity of 
citizens. The fact that the genesis of the principle goes back to the distinction between  church 
and state, as a way of dealing with religious pluralism, has over time been interpreted to entail 
that other cultural questions as well is something state policy and constitutional codes should 
not make reference to. The competing views on whether government ought to be neutral is 
difficult to dissect and compare because theorists have different understandings of what 
neutrality means. Thus, while Taylor is skeptical of the principle in itself because it has 
incoherent implications, he at the same time finds it uncontroversial to defend the idea of a non-
neutral government is consistent with many of the commitments that defenders of the neutrality 
principle refer to, such as the distinction between church and state, moral autonomy and cultural 
diversity (Taylor 1994, 250). 
 




Defenders of the neutrality principle take it as a crucial moral argument for limited government 
that does not aim to institute a virtuous picture of the good society into government, which is 
why the principle is often contrasted to perfectionist government, the idea that the state should 
shape its citizens in accordance with ethical ideals of how humans should live. In this thesis 
however, most arguments surrounding neutrality concerns whether the liberal state can justify 
policy or its constitution in reference to the cultural understandings of a polity, or pursue 
collective goals, not necessarily aiming to create virtuous, better persons in accordance with 
cultural or philosophical ideas about objective human goods, even though the same arguments 
against neutrality might be plausible in both these respects and sometime connect to one another 
since different cultures have widely shared understandings on what humans should strive for in 
life There are roughly three versions of the neutrality principle in liberal theory. The first 
concern neutrality of aim, which informs us that governmental policy ought not deliberatively 
aim to promote one way of life or conception of value, above another. The second, neutrality 
of justification, demands that policies are independently justifiable from any conception of the 
good viewed comparatively better than another. While the third, neutrality of effect, means that 
policies should not result in advantaging or disadvantaging one way of life above others, which 
very few defend given that people make different choices in life they themselves are responsible 
for (Arneson 2003, 191-192). 
Contemporary theorist shares with their classical sources the idea that liberalism, as a political 
morality, can informs us why political institutions can be just through assumptions about 
individual interests. Kymlicka (1988) for example, argues that this endeavour could go via a 
commitment to autonomy, which first posits the universal interest everyone has in living a good 
life, and subsequently the conditions needed to determine, discover, and re-articulate what we 
want. It follows that all have an interest in exercising the capacity for rational reflection in order 
to make use of possible opportunities, in order to counteract fixed expectations of how we 
should live given that our ends could be different under circumstances where we are able to 
exercise rational agency. Though we might be wrong about which ends are correct for us, the 
objective human good is conditioned on our own realization. That is, the nature of good is such 
that its value depends on our autonomous choice. The good life is led in accordance with our 
original way of being. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that we require different resources 
and liberties, such as education, free speech, and a cultural framework that provides us with 




individuals are entitled to equal consideration of their interests. According to Kymlicka, the 
reason why liberals oppose paternalistic government is not because they are moral relativists 
who think that all ways of living are equally valuable or good, nor is it right to posit that liberals 
think individual interests are intelligible outside society. The motivation for justifying rights 
and liberties on an individualistic basis is precisely because human beings often are wrong 
about what a valuable life consists of, and the value of liberty as a device is to shield us from 
conformist dynamics that hinder us to find out what is valuable (ibid, 182-183). 
Here we see that the neutrality principle of justification is defended in relation to the value 
people place in developing human capacities and our ability to devise a life plan. The principle 
also captures the fact that we must respect the distinct nature of state, culture, and society. The 
political concerns of the state must not make evaluative judgments on the life of its citizens and 
to value a cultural marketplace entails that politics must be justified without reference to 
particular ways of living under the assumption that cultural life sustains itself. The interest of 
the communities that individuals are part of will be protected via individual entitlements to 
material resources and civil liberties, so that individuals can reaffirm their own attachments. 
The fact that we can act as autonomous beings, exercising critical choices of our ends is 
something that requires respect through institutions that provide us with the ability to do so, 
where neutrality affirms the moral entitlement to be able to critically examine autonomous 
choices and responsibility, where social attachments is the context that provides us with choices 
and values to guide us (Kymlicka 1989, 904, )  
As we will explore later, Habermas (1993), unlike Kymlicka, thinks that conceptions of the 
good that a community abides by ought to evaluated in some liberal political arenas, but this is 
partially because he thinks it is necessary to avoid the entrenchment of fixed positions it could 
create without this discourse. His reasoning here is that without taking account of questions of 
identity and culture, individuals are less likely to be autonomous because cultural practices are 
sustained in the civic sphere without having been properly deliberated about in open forums 
based on equal participation. Without this domain, we are more vulnerable to having our social 
positions perpetuated without our own reflection. For Kymlicka however, the state is distinctly 
an apparatus founded on the distribution of primary goods, it is no forum. As we shall see, while 
Habermas is suspicious of Taylor’s claim that the social practices we already have are the moral 




forums of deliberations, individuals are left critically unexamined in their social integration 
(ibid, 8).  
However, many of the considerations above leave out the fact that liberals also have various 
understandings of democracy given that conceptions of, and demands that follow from, freedom 
and autonomy alone does not necessarily impose a necessary connection to a distinct form of 
government. Since classical liberalism posits that individual interests are secured by rights, 
where the confounds of limited government leave individuals free to pursue goods and compete 
with others, this extends into a view of democracy as another avenue of interest pursuit. In its 
ideal form, classical liberalisms therefore understand democracy and the administrative state 
on par with market-dynamics, where collective goals are the aggregation and weighing of 
individual interests constrained by constitutional codes of checks and balances and individual 
rights in the state apparatus. This characterization is, however, an ideal form that overlooks the 
nuances in the liberal tradition. As liberalism emphasize the necessity of toleration amongst 
different people to preserve the peace and govern our interactions in accordance with justice 
based on individual rights, as an aspect of democracy, liberal constitutionalism also aims to 
embody forms of self-government which includes the possibility to continuously interpret, 
contest and justify our principles (Pettit 1993, 170-175). 
Macedo (1988) for example, argues that this type of constitutionalism includes the expectation 
that we can object to the exercise of power and be met with justified reasons, which is something 
we are owed under the banner of reasonable treatment. The norm that reasons for the use of 
power belongs in public supports judicial review and the rule of law, which gives citizens the 
ability to challenge others, including public officials, on their own interpretations of rights and 
laws in light of the coercive use of power. The exercise of judicial review together with 
continuous interpretation of the constitution ensures that the use of power resembles forms of 
self-government in light of public reasons that citizens are owed and can make use of.  Liberal 
constitutionalism can be understood as something that is constituted by the ideal of public moral 
justification. On Macedo’s understanding, liberalism is not merely some empty framework, but 
constitutes a virtuous political community, which go against the shared belief by many liberals 
that the state is merely a on overarching framework of the associations in civil society yet has 




evolve around competing understandings of what this substantive commitment consists of, the 
moral reasons to support the rule of law and neutrality (ibid, 215). 
3.1 The atomic conception of the self? 
Taylor’s political philosophy is shaped by his criticism of ‘atomic’ conceptions of the self that 
underestimate man’s dialogical nature and misunderstand social structures. He claims that 
salient concepts in political theory, such as freedom and rights, have atomist pretenses 
embedded within them, which means that they are reasoned about as if they only were self-
evident properties of individuals, without recognizing that they have cultural conditions that 
sustain and proliferate them. If we value of freedom, individual rights or virtuous ideals and 
artistic artifacts, we ought to affirm the traditions and cultural forms of life that have articulated 
what they mean, why they are important and enable us to make use of them, rather than positing 
that society is by itself always a hindrance against liberty. As I will discuss in more detail later, 
this is why Taylor is inspired by the republican tradition of thought, which unlike liberals, are 
skeptical of the claim that individuals have natural rights, but rather conceives democratic 
society as the domain that constitutes rights and freedom (Taylor 1995, 218). 
This is why the methodology we use to infer political rights, liberties, and obligations should 
not be based through the imagery of persons standing outside their social environment. An 
atomic conception of the self is the idea that persons can be self-sufficient, which means that it 
can be treated as something that enjoy the full range of human capabilities that enable 
meaningful choices in accordance with their goals and aspirations, without making reference to 
its dependency on social life, community, and a larger civilization. Taylor traces the idea of the 
atomic self-back to enlightenment epistemology and political philosophy, an era where 
philosophers exaggerated the human capacity for reason by neglecting the social dependency 
of rational agency. The Cartesian idea of a rational self, capable of discerning the world and the 
foundations of firm knowledge in isolation from others, made it intellectually defensible to 
conceptually isolate individuals from surrounding attachments, through a conception of persons 
as pre-social, rational selves, to justify principles of social organization and legitimate political 
authority as the result of a social contract founded on individual interests. From this, we have 
inherited a “vision of society as in some sense constituted by individuals for the fulfilment of 




Classical liberalism usage of social-contract theory, the idea that we can reason about political 
principles for the organization of society by imaging society as a contract established by rational 
participants who agree to give up some liberty in exchange for the common protection of the 
state, is the originator of the atomic outlook in political theory. The participants in this contract 
are assumed to be self-sufficient in the sense that they have full human capabilities, an identity, 
and life prospects and interests, all of which are only constituted within society. The interest 
that society guarantees are only an elevation and protection of individual interests, which is 
why the covenant is presumed to be rational. To the extent that these individuals have identity, 
its constitution is understood as a convergence in the pre-political state of nature, rather than a 
meaningful commonality. The conception that persons are pre-socially constituted, rights-
bearing subjects, whose accomplishments in life are solely their own achievement without 
regard for the larger infrastructure that make us succeed and do great things in life, is an image 
that have and will continue to erode the significance we ought to attach to social life (ibid, 207) 
When the atomic conception of the self is implicitly utilized as a way of understanding 
collective actions, social structures and goods, as well as human capabilities and conditions for 
living a good life, the flawed image of the self-sufficient person capable of establishing and 
pursuing his end on his own entrenches itself. For example, methodological individualism is 
one attempt to explain the properties of a collective phenomenon by reducing the aggregated 
contributions down to its individual level. This method is effective in understanding convergent 
goods, but not irreducible shared goods whose meanings depend on a shared nature, where the 
good in question is transformed by concerted enjoyment. The effects of a dam for example, is 
a social good capable of being reduced to the benefits of different individuals, but a concert, or 
a fishing trip with friends, has a common value that is more than its individual parts, and not 
properly individual goods. They are rather common goods enjoyed by individuals together. 
While individuals could in theory shield themselves from a flood on their own, the value of 
decomposable common goods follows from the references our moral nature makes to 
intersubjective and common meanings in a common world. An atomic conception of the self 
fails to account for how self-expression as individuals a dialogical process within 
intersubjective frameworks is founded on language and traditions, which make meaningful 
choices possible. The health and vibrancy of social goods have consequences for individuals 




Culture itself contains certain understandings and institutions that make us able to appreciate 
things that are not in themselves individual goods. It is only because of our cultural background 
that make us able to appreciate certain forms of arts, because we have access to a rich language 
that would be unintelligible to a person belonging to an ancient culture. The same goes for the 
value of equality amongst citizens, in that individuals together share the common meaning that 
their equal status as rights bearing citizens, and that there is something valuable about living in 
a society where citizens can have their say, where everyone is accountable to the law, and that 
there’s certain ways a political decision that effects society should be made. This good belongs 
to everyone, yet it depends on everyone understanding its meaning, the fact that we all share 
the same dignity as citizens and that this society is a higher and worthier form of life than living 
under a benevolent dictator  (Taylor 1995, 135-140). 
3.2 Ontology and Advocacy 
The methodological individualism that classical liberalism builds on is a flawed, atomic, 
ontology that cannot explain how societies sustain themselves, how individual identity is 
constituted in relation to social dynamics, and the social conditions needed to uphold liberal 
commitments to individual rights, democracy and political legitimacy, all of which depend on 
a common meaning. Taylor argues that there is a mismatch between the political theory’s level 
of advocacy and its ontological foundation. While ontologies aim to describe the social reality, 
issues of advocacy concern the stand we take on policies, constitutional structures, obligations, 
and how individual and collective concerns must be weighed. Though these levels of socio-
political thinking are distinct, ontology serves as the background that renders advocacy issues 
intelligible as it forms the questions we ask in relation to our understanding of human nature, 
agency, and society, and make us more aware of certain factors we think matters to explain 
social life. Thus, ontology does set the parameters of our normative understandings of how 
society should be structured and organized, to the extent that it possible, desirable, or just 
(Taylor 1995, 181-183, 200-203). 
Taylor’s claim that the correct ontology of social life his holistic rather than atomic informs us 
that the self’s determination and fundamental interests is conditioned on the totality of common 
processes that language, as a mode of human expressions, bring forth; and the recognition that 




depends on being enjoyed in common. The question of what follows from this tenet is contested. 
By its own it does not legitimize any particular form of politics as there are no criteria to judge 
the soundness of the many candidates that make the move from this ontology. For Taylor, the 
connection between the two levels of argument is complicated by his own view that social 
theory is seldom purely descriptive, but rather validated on the basis of how it affects people’s 
self-understanding.2 The fact that Taylor thinks that a good social theory provides tools to 
interpret social dynamics in ways that can change or affirm our understanding of social life, is 
part of his criticism of methodological individualism, in that it distorts rather than illuminate 
our pre-theoretical understandings of social goods, such as democracy. This is why a flawed 
ontology can bring about undesirable forms of life if people internalize the view that culture or 
social relationships are only instruments for individual ends. Beyond the fact that such a 
distortion is unfortunate in itself for the individuals appreciation for the meaning of 
attachments, he also thinks it can undermine vital conditions that political units depend on to 
sustain themselves (Taylor 1985b, 91-95). 
While many theorists in the liberal tradition has recognized man’s social nature and cultural 
dependence, they have premised political theory on models that assume an isolated person 
whose preferences as a pre-social being, can be established via abstraction, in order to derive 
political principles on the relationship between state and citizens. By constructing society as 
some sort of contract that individuals can enter into, we neglect the fact that individuals are 
constituted as persons within society, which our political methodology should reflect The 
atomic ontology that social-contract theory builds on must therefore be replaced by a holistic 
ontology which gives better attention to what sustains individual rights, and how individual 
interests and conception of what is valuable and good in life are formed in dialogical relations. 
He writes that the social conditions of liberty ought to tell us that that it: 
“requires a certain understanding of self, one in which the aspirations to autonomy and 
self-direction become conceivable; and second, that this self-understanding is not 
 
2 He writes that the purpose of social theory is to offer an “account of underlying processes and mechanisms of 
society, and as providing the basis of a more effective planning of social life” (ibid, 92). He mentions as an example 
how a workers interpretation of his relationship to the labour market can be completely changed if he accepts a 




something we can achieve on our own, but that our identity is always partly defined in 
conversation with others or through the common understanding which underlies the 
practices of our society” (Taylor 1985b, 209). 
Since we cannot step outside social life to find out who we are, what values we hold, learn 
about our own possibilities and gather knowledge about the world, all of which are the full 
range of human capabilities that society enables, it follows that society cannot be constructed 
as some instrument where all obligations towards each other follow from a singular foundation 
established via contract. This is because such a view would undermine all the conditions that 
make autonomy possible given that by valuing autonomy we ought to value societies that 
sustain its possibility. The atomic ontology overlooks that liberal values need a social 
foundation to be respected and are upheld by a political culture where people share common 
meanings. In addition, the many linguistic concepts we organize liberal politics around, such 
as justice, freedom, and equality, are only meaningful as evaluative terms because they have 
been fostered and given meaningful interpretations within different cultures. It is only because 
we have access to language, as a mode of cultural expression, that we understand the meaning 
of freedom or individual rights as something we can reason and discuss, since traditions have 
brought them forward to us. For Taylor, the move from ontology to advocacy involves the claim 
that individual rights cannot serve as the singular principle of how we think about political 
relationships, as there are other goods individuals seek and establish through communal living, 
where we need some form of common bond amidst our differences in order to preserve the 
legitimacy of democracy amidst the various social tensions that can arise, which is why liberal 
society needs a conception of a valuable good life that our institutions proliferate, and stand 
for.  Since culture is reproduced in common, Taylor thinks that there are some things that 
individuals value that cannot be secured through free market mechanisms. He argues that some 
social goods or institutions that help uphold cultural structures can be justified in virtue of this 
social thesis, that relate to culture, political societies, and civil associations (Taylor 1995, 183-
186) 
3.3 Liberal foundationalism 
Taylor argues that modern moral-political approaches to moral pluralism, in the search for 




differences in ways that oversimplifies the meaning diverse ways of life have to people, and 
thus operate with a flawed view of person which in turn undermines our social attachments. 
Since humans have a diversity of goods that cannot be reduced to a singular quantifiable notion 
of preferences or interests, but instead value things in qualitative terms that cannot be ranked 
against each other, he rejects the idea that individual rights, or any other good for that matter, 
can serve as the foundational principle for political life, rather than standing on par with a 
variety of  considerations. 
The crux of Taylor’s arguments concerns the self-understanding liberal theory profess against 
liberal values like autonomy, freedom and equality, as foundational products of reason which 
are in fact only morally intelligible given their critical function in fulfilling a prior affirmation 
of human capacities the social life needs to sustain itself. It is only by assuming that aspects of 
human life ought to be fostered that we can make sense of our evaluation of why individuals 
are entitled to rights. In the same way that a just distribution of resources is only intelligible 
through our understanding of a good life and the nature of social affairs, liberty is only valuable 
because it lets us pursue our what we take to be our higher purposes. Individual rights or liberty 
cannot be the foundational principles for political theory in ways that disguise that they derive 
from our conception of the good. We cannot escape the qualitative contrasts we make use of in 
orienting ourselves in the moral space of different goods, and by abstracting away from moral 
diversity ideas about universal interests, rights-oriented liberalism marginalizes questions of 
the good life.  Taylor thinks that the same drive in modern ethics to ‘narrow morality’ is evident 
in modern political theory because it is much easier to establish that it is “better that men’s 
desires be fulfilled than they be frustrated, that they be happy rather than miserable”. Rights-
oriented liberalism is attractive because they present themselves to be founded on self-evident 
or neutral premises that better resist the charge of relativism than those founded on qualitative 
contrasts. However, the claim that this foundation is distinct in this way is an illusion since 
“some forms of ethical reasoning are being privileged over others, because in our civilization 
they come less into dispute or look easier to defend” (1985b, 241).3  
 
3 A ‘narrow morality’ is used by Taylor to refer to ethical and political theories that prioritize the right above and 




In order to asses Taylor’s critique it is uncontroversial to first reply that few liberals, if any, 
think of individuals and society in the atomic terms Taylor at times implies and that Taylor 
does not give proper credit to the motivation and purposes behind social-contract methodology 
as a way of testing our intuitions about legitimate political authority through properties that 
individuals share in common. It was never meant to involve a serious claim that individual 
identity is a self-sufficient endeavor, nor that individuals are not socio-political animals that 
develop and exist within societies many social relations, nor that all human goods can be 
deduced from a singular principle. The central motivation for the classical social-contract 
theorists was the question of how to accommodate moral pluralism with the aim of devising 
principles of mutual toleration and peace amidst religious conflicts, exactly because they 
recognized how important cultural attachments and social forms of living is to people. The 
prominence of rights was merely the necessary instrument to bring different people together in 
order for their respective values to resist the claim of entitled dominance over society by 
coercing others into their mode of being (Tuck 1994, 164).  
Many liberals argue that Taylor’s social thesis is at best a correction of unarticulated premises 
that liberal rights-oriented paradigms can accommodate. While some theorists are sympathetic 
to aspects of the social thesis, many reject the idea that there can be irreducible social goods. 
Though the difference between ontological and advocacy levels of political thinking are 
distinct, in order to be consistent, the connection between the two are closer than Taylor admits. 
This is because in a holistic ontology, in the order of explanation of a social phenomenon we 
go via properties that belong the whole, rather than its parts, and simultaneously hold that social 
goods cannot be reduced. Taylor’s politics, on an ideal construction, seems to fall in line with 
a holistic ontology as the foundation for the liberal order. In contrast to the claim that atomism 
cannot without incoherency inform us of the meaning of social entities and the essential 
dynamics of culture and society, we would have to prove that communities uphold themselves 
because they are dynamic entities whose shape and form change in accordance with their 
 
it is good to be, and what the nature of the good life consists of. The relevancy this has to Taylor’s political 




memberships evolving modifications in ways that Taylor overlooks. Is not consent and interest 
sufficient to sustain communal forms of living?  
Many critics of Taylor argue that the conditions that sustain culture could be threatened by 
some forms of political entities since relationships are grown and discovered rather than 
something that could be institutionalized via predetermined expectation of what a community 
is, and how it should continue to be. From this follows the argument that we ought to stick by 
liberal institutions that treat relationships and communities as evolving entities that can sustain 
themselves. Den Uyl (2006) argues that Taylor’s holistic ontology combined with individualist 
politics is unstable and threatening to civil society because, given the fact that individuals are 
rejected as the primary unit for explanation, if a conflict between whole and part emerge, 
individual wishes, wants and projects could be subordinated to defined social understandings 
as representative of the social (ibid, 849). 
Taylor’s worry is the instrumental evaluation of political norms, where individualism erodes 
the very foundation of liberal culture given that it cannot value its structure beyond themselves 
as it lacks an ethical basis. Even if some sort of social dynamic is needed to sustain liberal 
political culture, does this common meaning resemble a common end? Can it not legitimize its 
form through ‘metanorms’ that protect a structure surrounding the socio-political domain where 
individuals live their lives according to their own substantial ends? In order to explore these 
themes more systematically it is necessary to place Taylor’s claims about ontology and 
advocacy within the larger debate between liberals and communitarians, which in turn better 
positions us to explore contemporary liberal theory (ibid, 854). 
3.4 Procedural liberalism and the communitarian critique  
The liberal tradition thinks of individual liberty, and the conditions of autonomy, as standing 
beyond and above the individuals communal place, in order to counter hierarchy, communal 
conformity and fixed social positions. In order to achieve this, the only common good is a 
system that guarantees liberty, dignity, and welfare, namely the neutral constitution that 
upholds rule of law and individual rights without being justified on substantial conceptions of 
the good life. In order to spell out the relationship between Taylor’s political philosophy and 
his conception of individual identity, we need to understand his criticism of modern 




procedural liberalism undermines social life. These models often argue that a plural society 
necessitates that fair political institutions are justified when they are not based on particular 
moral outlooks that citizens hold, in order to secure everyone’s fundamental interest in living a 
good life, and thereby respecting the moral autonomy of citizens on an equal basis. There are 
different ways to ground these commitments where the term ‘procedural’ is meant to bring out 
that the just organization of society can be demonstrated and discerned via methods that are 
rational and neutral towards all, rather than coupling the concept of social justice with particular 
social conventions. This is why the traditional liberal understanding of politics is commonly 
referred to as models that ‘prioritize the right above the good’, which is meant to bring out that 
the purpose and role of a liberal system of law is working as a framework for accommodating 
individuals self-chosen interest on the basis of individual rights, and not be engaged in the 
protection or promotion of collective goals or values affirmed within the cultural life of citizens, 
which at times might be overridden by the dictates of law in order to protect minorities 
(Kymlicka 1988, 182-183). 
Communitarian political theory is in large part a reaction to the methodology and normative 
recommendation of John Rawls ‘A theory of justice’ where he proposes general principles of 
political justice assigned to the economic and political institutions of society. While most 
liberals that follow Rawls way of thinking about political justice seek to institutionalize the 
conditions that guarantee individual autonomy, many communitarians claim that liberal theory 
in effect undermines individual autonomy by paying too little attention to individual’s 
attachments to their communities. Communitarianism object to liberal understandings of law, 
society, democracy, and identity. They complain that liberalism either fails to appreciate the 
value of community, or advocate policies that undermine its foundation. Even though liberals 
acknowledge individual dependence and embeddedness in various relationships, they differ 
with communitarians about normative consequences this has for the state’s responsibilities, for 
example questions regarding redistribution, the use of judicial review, the extent of individual 
rights, or normative ideas about the size and scope of a federal, or unitary state. Within the 
literature of communitarian thought we can identity four themes of criticism (Caney 1992, 273). 
The first claim resembles Taylor’s criticism of social-contract theory, namely that political 
theory must operate with a methodology that recognize mans situated nature and his culturally 




interests can be established pre-socially. Many communitarians argue that individual identity 
is identical to its established ends, and thus we cannot assume to know what his fundamental 
interest is prior to social life. A crucial aspect of human nature is the identity constituting feature 
of social forms of living that a liberal conception of the self, as a methodological step in making 
the argument of what autonomy requires, fails to accommodate. We cannot imagine a neutral 
position where rational actors are able to discern cross-cultural moral-political claims for the 
organization of society. Instead political reasoning must be contextualized. Though Taylor 
recognizes that contemporary liberals are not blind to the fact that identity is constituted within 
society, his main criticism is that the methodology employed simplifies socio-political life in 
ways that are unfit to accommodate the relationship between individuals and society given that 
socio-political life is too complex to be approached via principles that pre-determine the form 
of social organization. This simplification touch on the second claim that communitarians raise, 
namely the issue of state neutrality in the face of modern societies diverse nature of diverging 
values (Taylor 1995, 182-193). 
Here, communitarians deny that neutrality is the marker of a just state, and question the claim 
that neutrality is necessary to recognize the equal dignity of all citizens by refraining from 
justifying policies or constitutional codes in reference to cultural ideas about the good life. 
Liberals argue that without neutrality, the state will favor some views of others, and that 
questions of culture are something only individuals have to affirm amongst themselves within 
a system of law. As we will explore in detail, Taylor thinks neutrality in all its forms are 
incoherent, unnecessary, and undesirable. It is incoherent because all politics imply conceptions 
of the good. It is unnecessary because non-neutral politics do not necessarily erode individual 
autonomy. And it is undesirable because a liberal polity depends on a culturally conditioned 
affirmation of the many goods that matter to people, and the stability and legitimacy of a liberal 
regime must have an expressive aspect within its political society that relate to the historically 
situated ideals and experience of a people. Taylor wants to defend a broad model of citizenship 
that is not an impediment to pluralism, but instead recognizes difference as the basis of society 
as a common end. The necessity of non-neutrality concerns to the third communitarian theme, 
which concern their criticism of civic integration between individuals and society. Taylor 
argues that liberal principles are not enough to sustain a polity without some shared overarching 
understanding of who they are as a civic polity, which includes affirming collective goals and 




because they identify with their social institutions and the form of life it proliferates (Taylor 
1998, 153-154). 
The last theme concerns whether norms can enjoy universal status. Taylor does not join 
company with those who defend meta-ethical claims which tell us that political principles like 
justice and freedom are relative to the shared understandings of a particular community, and 
that communal values have an authority in themselves. For example, the claim that a caste 
system, the idea that different people by birth have certain rights relative to their hierarchical 
position, can be just because it accords with people’s beliefs. Taylor does not reject the ideal 
that moral reasoning aims to articulate universal principles that have cross-cultural validity; 
however, he has been criticized for promoting moral relativism. As I will show, Taylor is no 
relativist but only invites this reading through his claim that we should not insist on always 
imposing what is right when people hold radical different conceptions of the good life. His 
criticism of liberal universal pretension is motivated by political prudence, given that particular 
self-understandings are necessary aspects for moral-political principles to be respected. Though 
morality involves cross-cultural claims, sometimes we ought to resist the temptation to impose 
them. Related to this we find reason to argue that many political issues cannot be understood 
as competing interests around fairness, but rather competing conceptions the good when 
people’s moral views collide with each other (Bell 2005, 225) 
4.  The bounds of liberalism   
If liberal theory cannot account for the value of community, or foster ways of living that 
undermine communal vitality, how should we correct its atomic ontology? Though liberalism 
claims to be neutral about the nature of the good life, they in effect affirm that it consists of 
exercising critical self-reflection and autonomous choice while at the same time neglecting the 
extent to which our social attachments constrain how extensive these practices can be. The ideal 
typology of communitarianism is a political theory that rather preserves individual autonomy 
via taking community and communal attachment as the centerpiece of normative consideration 
and imagines that the cultural life in itself can be turned into a political community4. However, 
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Taylor rejects any communitarianism that is defined in contrast to liberalism in this way. Just 
as liberalism is too concerned with the priority of neutrality or individual rights as the singular 
principles of political theory, he also finds it flawed to flip the script and instead take 
understandings of community, and communal protection, as appropriate normative modes. 
Neither of these approaches give credence to the fact that moral political thinking involves 
prudence among various important goods where neither one can serve as an overarching 
principle to think about political and ethical life (Taylor 1994, 250-251). 
There are various ways that liberals have responded to communitarian critiques. Some argue it 
can never provide a desirable alternative to the main frames of liberal theory as an overarching 
union of civil life, given that the conditions of modern society is to diverse for us  to blur the  
line between state and society, and therefore we must maintain that the domains that the liberal 
state enables for political contestation are not communities. Stephen Macedo (1988), however, 
does think liberal democratic states, to the extent that they depend on fostering civil virtues, do 
constitute a political community founded on the principle of impartiality and public 
justification, which requires liberal virtues on part of the polity in order to sustain itself. As we 
will later see, his conception of liberalisms substantive commitments resembles, although only 
partially, some of Taylor’s understanding of liberalism as substantive doctrine. However, 
Macedo maintains that communitarianism is flawed in that they undermine the necessity of the 
moral perspective of public reasoning, where they too often falsely assume or reason as if 
boundaries between political communities are drawn on the basis of common meanings within 
each unit.  He further argues that liberals are not committed to a conception of the self 
completely unencumbered from its own aims and attachments, but only the moral necessity of 
the self to have the resources needed to critically evaluate its own attachments and ends, without 
which, we fail to respect the equal dignity of members of a community that might differ in their 
evaluation of their communal given ends. Whatever commitments we have, there is a demand 
that our identities must retain a distance large enough from them that enable us to engage in 
critical evaluation. It is true that we depend on community to develop our moral vocabulary 
 





and capacities, however the political community of the state is made up of various sorts of civic 
communities (ibid, 221-224). 
For Macedo, liberal constitutionalism comes with the ideal that policies ought to be justified in 
public. This ideal is the morality behind judicial review, the practice of courts testing cases 
against established conventions and laws, which makes “constitutional government a publicly 
principled enterprise”. This tells us that this continuous interpretation, the practice of public 
morality, not only belongs to courts, but governments and citizens as well. This is why, in both 
practice and theory, liberal constitutionalism comes with substantive ideals connected to both 
citizenship and community, and thus the communitarian critique is flawed to the extent that 
they recommend something that is already there (ibid, 215). 
Macedo (1998) is also willing to bite the bullet in the face of Taylor’s criticism that liberalism 
cannot be culturally neutral5, in that he admits that liberalism is a fighting creed that is bounded 
by citizens self-understanding. This is because valuing the “political authority of public 
reasons” involves recognition of the fact that liberal constitutionalism has transformative and 
educational dimensions embedded within itself. Without appreciating this dimension, we end 
up with a model that takes the liberal personality for granted as a natural parameter. One 
example that illustrates the transformative function of the system are the mechanisms of civic 
or humanistic education. The citizens that a liberal constitutional regimes requires for its 
sustainability cannot be taken for granted, but has to, and have historically been shaped and 
formed. Macedo mentions as an example the American historical relationships to Catholics on 
the questions of the education systems curriculums, as well as the school systems function not 
only as a service given to those who could not afford private schooling, but a civic project of 
bringing together and integrating children from various backgrounds into a common institution 
funded on values meant to promote a sense of common citizenship and attachment. On a 
transformative understanding of liberalisms citizens, Macedo argues that there is a need for the 
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depends on a cultural self-understanding and cannot without controversy be insisted to be a neutral demand via 




government to secure that “future citizens acquire the character traits, habits and virtues they 
must have if the liberal political project is to survive and thrive” (ibid, 59) 
As an end, the liberal political morality requires a view of diversity where we are not blind to 
the fact that a liberal order depends on the virtues and character of the civilian sphere, and given 
the support they constitute, their shape and form is of public concern. Macedo understands 
liberalism as more than the valuating individual freedom as the end of our story, for to put 
liberty at the center of one’s values obligates one to secure the conditions for its sustainability, 
and therefore the liberal cannot be blind to the necessity of a shared civic culture where 
individuals need moral education in the virtues of liberal constitutional citizenship (ibid, 58-
69). 
4.1 What is a community? 
When Taylor says that our identity is ‘partly’ defined through others, how far does this partially 
extend, and in what way does it connects to various forms of social life?  Kukathas (1996 b) 
argues that both sides of the liberal communitarian debate are mistaken in their understanding 
and evaluation of community. He argues that whereas Taylor criticism of liberalism embodies 
a recipe for fostering political communities that are not consistent with his own valuation of 
civil communities and cultural life, Macedo in his response undermine the liberal commitment 
to pluralism; in his all too willing eagerness to impose the dictates of the state into civilian life 
(ibid, 82). Kukathas (1996) argue an ontology that views society as a collection of individuals 
are largely correct and gives greater reference to what Taylor undermines, namely competition 
and conflict between individuals. People associate with each other to find mechanisms that can 
mediate conflicts in peaceful proceedings, yet the purpose is only to transform this conflictual 
aspect. This is consistent with the fact that there are common interests such as the sustainability 
of an established order or associative bonds based on solidarity. The fact that people cooperate 
and have common ends does not change the fact that society is a collection of different persons. 
This alone does not propose a connection to rights-based liberalism, nor a distinct view about 
human nature, but does inform us to not overlook the fact that society has value because it 
promotes individual welfare.  Kukathas argues that just because men can only exist in society 
is consistent with the fact that individual interests are the hearth of social living, since society’s 




they still matter because they are valued by an individual. What more purpose could society 
have? To correct the extent of which social goods partially embed our own identity we need to 
investigate closer the different forms of community that exists and how they relate to our 
identity (Kukathas 1996, 70-72). 
Community denotes a kind of association between people, whose meaning is defined via 
contested characterizations of whether we are embedded by them or belong to them. Though 
communitarians concede that we are only partially constituted by community, they maintain 
that liberals do not grasp the significance that our identification with community matters for 
our own. That fact that communities matter tells us nothing about what communities are. Some 
might be geographically situated, such as a neighborhood, a club, a city, or a village, while 
others are not demarcated by space such as business, science, or fitness communities. We can 
progress in this regard by distinguishing between three models of community, and the various 
political significance attributed to them by different political traditions. The first model 
distinguishes communities from associations by the fact that members share not only 
geographic proximity but most crucially by the fact that they share a common origin of 
experience (Kukathas 1996 b, 83) 
Whereas associations are something people form, community is something one is born into. 
Given that identity in this regard is taken to be a natural relationship, the value of these types 
of communities have often had their significance articulated and defended by conservatives. 
The second type of community denotes those formed on the basis of common interests between 
members with a close proximity to one another. Here having a shared origin is not necessary 
so long as the individual members are united by the wellbeing of their group. This model aligns 
with socialists critique of conservative thought given that the real interests people have is 
establishing identities on the basis of intentional relationships that express their actual, rather 
than artificial, concerns. The last type identifies communities with a shared interest. This 
interest differs from the second type in that it is not necessarily a commitment to a common 
good but instead a community formed through the recognition of mutual advantages. 
Communities of this sort can span across regions and borders and given that the bonds that unite 
them are weak they are more like partial associations. It is this model of community, Kukathas 
argues, that is most in line with the liberal traditions understanding of pluralism and toleration. 




different people, but instead a framework of law that allows different partial communities to 
develop (ibid, 83-84). 
When political society governed by liberal framework is reduced to a partial associations it is 
clear that it is not really a community at all. He writes that: 
“A community is essentially an association of individuals who share an understanding 
of what is public and what is private within that association” (ibid, 85). 
Social groupings are distinct from associations that constitute communities because only the 
latter have particular shared understanding of what is of public concern. Communities share 
mutual expectancies of what is a proper way to behave, and the merits of interfering with 
someone’s behavior. Though members of a community might disagree on what should be done 
in response to a public concern, they are able to identify when something is of public concern 
to the community and simultaneously, there is a shared understanding of what is properly 
private. Though shared interests are a necessary aspect of community, there also has be shared 
understandings of mutual obligations that stem from this membership. This is significant 
because it signals a mutual understanding by all that individual identity is not determined in 
full by communal belonging. The extent to which this membership influences individual 
identity depends on the quantity of other communities individuals are part of, the individuals 
own judgment for how significant a particular membership is for him as a person, and his 
dependency on the community. This is why  
“few, if any, communities can constitute an individual’s identity, because few, if any, 
individuals are locked in a single community which leaves no room for other 
attachments to which the group is indifferent. In this sense, all communities are partial 
communities” (ibid, 86). 
Communities are also unstable depending on their own divisions. A diverse community with 
different traditions might challenge the common recognition of obligations that the community 
depends on, which could change or break them up. However, this is still consistent with the 
recognition that some social attachments are more important for individual identity than others. 
Part of the reason why is either because of personal commitment, or because of surrounding 




Yet they will still be partial associations so long as the individual has an interest in his own 
private affairs and multitude of attachments. It follows that a political community is “an 
association of individuals who share an understanding of what is public and what is private 
within their polity” (ibid, 87).  
Here, members will share mutual understanding of what its political institutions ought to 
concern itself with, and what it has no legitimate business in interfering with, which will vary 
across different societies. Even though members will contest the recognition of what lies within 
the domains of public or private, this does not alter their political community which exists so 
long as the conventions by which it is defined as are recognized. The relationship between 
political community and political institutions give rise to the question of how we understand 
the state itself. Political communities, unlike religious or academic communities, are 
concentrated geographically and have governments that administrates the polity. Thus, within 
one state there might be many different political communities, such as federal states, 
communes, or indigenous councils. Though people need to share some beliefs, these do not 
amount to comprehensive doctrines about the good. The fact that we are different people with 
different belief does not take away our understanding of belonging to a community with people 
different from us that we nonetheless share something in common with. 
Political community is only a ‘partial community’, which cannot constitute our identity given 
that it is only one out of many communities we recognize as belonging to. National identity 
might take on expressive force, but for the most part it would a false imposition to claim that it 
could ever be the only identity individuals have. It also is clear that the existence of political 
communities does not mean in itself that it is a good thing, on the contrary the correct 
understanding of what it is should “make us wary of assuming that political community is in 
some way the most important or the fundamental form of community which somehow subsumes 
or subordinates all others” (ibid, 89).  
The power of the modern state ought not to mislead us into thinking that individual identity is 
constrained by his belonging to its political community. While Taylor does not think that shared 
understandings of individuals ought to serve as the structural center for organization, he does 
think that these understandings are not something that can be ignored and separated completely 




communities, both national and local, are important domains of belonging. He also thinks that 
social attachments are partially intrinsic aspects of our identity and given the interdependent 
nature of the constitution of identity, recognizing these common goods ought to matter. For 
example, it merits the plausibility of supporting distinct forms of politics that supports 
reinforces the mutual nature, such as the promotion of cultural institutions that bind people 
together and provides an anchor in people’s lives. Since individual depend on community to 
live an autonomous life, the vibrancy of communities matters, we should not overlook that 
human goods cannot be attained in isolation from others (Taylor 1998, 153) 
For Kukathas, this position is only tenable if we ignore the extent to which social attachments’ 
partial nature. Even though some forms of community are especially important for identity, it 
can never be the only one that gives shape to our lives and will vary in its interpretation and 
meaning. Individual rights are important because, not because we can step outside all the 
attachments we are born and raised into, but because we exist in partial associations, which is 
why communitarians often undermine various partial commitments in favor of a supposed 
political community by exaggerating the meaning of nationality or citizenship as the markers 
of identity. The danger by doing so is that the politics recommended can weaken other forms 
of community that matters for individuals in the attempt to strengthen national communities 
(Kukathas 1996, 91) 
The danger with nationalism, according to Kukathas, is that it fails to demarcate in what way 
patriotism can be fostered in ways that preserve the liberal concern for pluralism which is 
marked by our diverse set of partial communities. Fostering nationalist sentiments has 
historically been a top to the bottom process, rather than the other way around which is why 
liberal commitments speak against the validity of fostering national identity on the presumption 
that it will suppress diversity. These attempts increase the likelihood of conflicts between the 
political community and other communities we belong to. Respecting this fluid character 
speaks against state-sanctioned recognition of cultural practices, collective goals or even 
subsidization of various civic associations. However, through Kukathas commitment to 
toleration he shares with Taylor the reluctancy to impose principles of the right, settled within 
political society, into various communities, although for different reasons. He thinks that if 
liberals want to protect pluralism, they should see that elevation of the political community as 




life. Political society ought not have a massive integrative function which conditions pluralism 
in relation to the principles that the state decides through an obsession of instituting unity across 
the polity. In the end, too many liberals as well as communitarians undermine that the political 
community is just another partial association, although a significant one (ibid, 92- 96). 
4.2 The dangers of the centralized state 
Though Kukathas understanding of political society is significantly different from Taylor, 
within the nuances of Taylor’s positions on identity, there is a great more agreement between 
the too than Kukathas presents it as. However, I do not think it is correct to assess that Taylor 
is blind to the conflictual element of social life given that his motivation for a differentiated 
understanding of citizenship within multinational societies is precisely motivated by the 
concern of diverse sets of cultural identities within a polity.6 In addition, while Taylor does 
defend the necessity of some form of national unity, he argues that this should never be imposed 
but rather fostered via toleration of different ways to be united within a polity, precisely because 
democracies have historically tended to exclude various local identities in favor of a national 
sense of sense of self. The temptation to exclude subsets of the population follows from the fact 
that a well-working democracy is founded on mutual trust and commitment. In its radical form, 
authoritarian forms of coercion can take place when political leadership demands that other 
succumb to their understanding of citizenship, for example in post-revolutionary Russia or 
France. Here exclusion goes via the imposed expectation of what patriotism within the political 
culture demands, and a demand that one’s civic identity has primary status above other forms 
of allegiance that matters for identity, such as religion, culture, or class. Though France and 
Russia are extreme historical examples, the dynamic they illustrate is still with us to the extent 
that citizens refuse to acknowledge that various forms of identity might be more fundamental 
to the individual than one’s status as a citizen. The cultural shift towards the ethics of 
authenticity, whereby the individual can live as she pleases without shame for not suppressing 
one’s way of being to fit with the molds of larger society provides merit to the claim that 
individuals are entitled to recognition of their way of being (Taylor 1998, 149). 
 




Given these dynamics, there has to be a way to protect individual identity and its partial 
communities against the exclusionary dynamics of the state. This is why democratic cultures 
need continuous reinvention of how they understand their collective identity alongside the 
inclusion of different people that alters the traditional culture via the inclusion of new identities. 
Given the fact of pluralism and the need to accommodate a diverse set of identities, it is common 
to understand the collective understanding of democracy via right-based liberalism rather than 
through civic virtue of a self-determined polity. This tendency is exemplified by the attempt to 
elevate elements of political culture as pillars of the states’ national identity in the face of 
increased diversity, by insisting on uniform treatment across different regions to guarantee 
equality. The solution is taken to be an identical set of rights and liberties that all individuals 
can make use of and partake in and share as citizens, which express our equal dignity. This is 
tempting because if society is already fragmented what sense does it make it the quest for unity 
to insist on something the social conditions do not allow for? (ibid, 150-151). 
Instead of waiting in vain for agreement about the good life, and the extent to which this informs 
collective identity, it’s better to agree on the notion that people have interests and that the best 
way to secure equal interests is freedom of choice on the basis of preference.  The liberal neutral 
model is attractive because people will never agree on the ends of life, and its best to live and 
let live under a system of equal rights that guarantees democratic conceptualization of equality, 
freedom and fairness. However, there are politically relevant ways that citizens can be 
connected beyond abstraction from difference. Rather than stating that commonality has to be 
constructed in spite of difference, bindings can be built because of them. Differences are 
complementarity contribution we can appreciate in common as a shared good that enriches their 
association. Here, we go beyond the standard liberal argument that we have an interest in 
choosing for ourselves how to live, but also note our moral interest in other’s authentic way of 
being as a unique contribution in the common enterprise of human achievement as a common 
good (ibid, 153-154). 
From this we see that, if anything, Kukathas criticism applies to the possibility that Taylor is 
overtly naïve in his belief that common identity can be built on differences beyond the 
liberalism Kukathas recommends, but not that Taylor is blind to the coercive effects of 
nationalism or the value of different communities. A significant disagreement however 




subsidization, when doing so is thought to be necessary to uphold communities and associations 
as a counterweight to the integrative functions of the state, precisely because state-sanctioned 
authority homogenizes difference. It is not enough to defend communities via the liberal 
assumption that individuals have enough of an interest in catering for their own communities. 
Here, it is assumed that all it takes to defend local communities is the guarantee of individual 
resources, such as civil rights and material benefits, that enable cultures, communities and 
associations to evolve naturally in concert with individuals own choices as the aggregation of 
society’s preferences. This point has been articulated by Michael Walzer (1990), who argues 
that such an approach would undermine liberal society itself, given that the integrity of civil 
society depends on certain associations that cannot survive on their own. 
 Walzer is motivated by the same concern as Kukathas, to keep the coercive, and potentially 
dangerous, powers of the state away from civilian life. In order to uphold neutrality with regards 
to the individuals fundamental question of what is valuable and worthy of pursuit in life there 
are ways in which the government cannot be neutral. Walzer argues that the standard liberal 
argument in favor of neutrality, does not take into consideration that a fragmented society 
without integrative functions of community and associations will lead to the increased 
imposition of the centralized state since this is the only union left to hold people together.  
Walzer’s argues that absent of this non-neutrality, local associations would be unable to serve 
their historical integrative function, that binds people together into trade-unions, guilds and 
other cultural avenues, that serve a critical function in the democratic process, as well as partial 
sources for individual identity. It is these communities that partly give meaning to individuals, 
and the liberal government committed to its own sustainability must subsidize associations that 
“seem most likely to provide shapes and purposes congenial to the shared values of a liberal 
society” (ibid, 17). 
Though it is true that liberal citizens are more alien toward one another than used to be the case, 
it is also true that communities and cultures are resilient entities, and given the social nature of 
individuals, so long as the human race survives there will always be new communities 
established in the place of old ones lost. Given this, communitarianism cannot be more than 
modified liberalism, given that individual rights, pluralism, free speech and association and 
political participation, are the vocabulary framework we understand ourselves in and is what 




the continuously developed communities within it then it follows that the communitarian 
correction cannot go beyond the fact there “is no one out there but separated, rights-bearing, 
voluntarily associating, freely speaking, liberal selves” where we could hope to educate people 
“to know themselves as social beings, the historical products of, and in part the embodiments 
of liberal values” (ibid, 15). 
Taylor too argues that various association in the civil sphere serve an integrative function and 
counterweight to the administrative state. Civil society are in some sense autonomous from the 
wider state, even though the state shapes the conditions of associations via rules of coexistence, 
the activities that goes on within this framework is not directed by it. Whereas the market 
economy is largely autonomous within civil society, the larger public sphere where public 
opinion is formed, is brought out through the common concerns of the polity via common points 
of reference. The workings and influences of associations matters not only to ground people 
with an anchor of belonging in the face of the transformative effects of free market liberalism, 
but also to work as an opposition to the dictates of the state, which Kukathas champions (Taylor 
1995, 215, 287). 
It is here we find various points of convergence between Kukathas and Taylor. My reading of 
Taylor does not lead me to think he would disagree with the notion that various forms of 
community are at best partial associations that have a limited claim on our allegiance and can 
never constitute our identity in its entirety. As mentioned, he also shares the unwillingness to 
insist that a concentrated state should have the power to override the understandings of local 
communities when doing so undermines significant goods we ought to consider. This is why 
he seeks to build a model of citizenship that does not insist that national identity has to be the 
most important identity that people understand themselves via (Taylor 1998, 154).    
4.3 The value of freedom 
Taylor’s understanding of liberty is part of his wider attempt to reconcile our dependency on 
wider society with our ability to be autonomous agents, and part of his criticism of liberals that 
he thinks are oblique to the social conditions of freedom. Whereas negative conception of 
freedom is rather straightforwardly understood as the absence of external interference in one’s 
affairs which guarantees our ability to do whatever we want, positive conceptions are more 




against freedom. Though many acknowledge that positive liberty, the state of being self-
directed and determined to act in accordance with one’s ideals, is a meaningful concept, few 
agree on its political relevance since within the liberal tradition, negative liberty has been an 
important tool in articulating how individual rights can set the legitimate frames of government-
interference by establishing the area of non-interference citizens are entitled to live their lives 
within. Beyond the minimal need of government to protect the liberty of citizens from theft and 
violence from others, the negative conception maintains that the wider the legally sanctioned 
area of non-interference, the greater our liberty (Taylor 1985b, 214-215). 
Some have attempted to resolve the distinction between the two conceptions through the idea 
that both interpret the same set of liberty-reducing parameters as a triadic relationship between 
an agent, preventive conditions, and his desired actions. In this way, negative conceptions locate 
impediments of liberty in the acts of others while positive conceptions locate them within an 
agent’s state of mind. Taylor’s account however affirms the distinct nature between the two by 
positing that freedom can be understood both as an opportunity concept, and as an exercise 
concept which capture the fact that liberty denotes the quality of agency in ways that cannot be 
reduced into interpretations of what constraints refers to.  As an exercise concept, positive 
liberty informs us that freedom involves being self-determined in relation to the significant and 
valuable and our ability to discriminate between our desires according to what we recognize as 
worthy of pursuit. Removing barriers that hinder this development is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition to be free. The opportunities this opens for us are worthless unless we have 
the necessary capacities to act in accordance with what we recognize as higher or lower forms 
of being which means that when freedom is invoked as an exercise concept, doing whatever 
you want is not sufficient for being free unless we are engaged in the critical evaluation of our 
desires. This is evident when we are acting out of ignorance, fear, or hatred. In the same way 
that being brought up in poverty with few material resources hinder our pursuits in life 
regardless of which opportunities are open to us, liberty is impeded if we live in an abusive 
society that deny us the personal resources to reach moral maturity to make autonomous choices 
about what is valuable in life. These reflections suggest that negative liberty alone is perhaps 
not the only guide to normative evaluations of the institutions of a free society. As dialogical 
selves, there is an extent to which community and cultural frames constitute freedom, by 
helping us come to see what our purpose in life consist of. Therefore, the capacity of a person’s 




our environments expressions of the human possibility, which affect our capacity to critically 
engage with the objective world and attribute meaning to it (ibid, 218-221). 
Isaiah Berlin suggested that positive conceptions of liberty are dangerous because they have at 
times invoked ideas about a divided self that longs to be liberated through the authentic, and 
rational part of the will, which in turn has been distorted by oppressive forms of government 
under the guise of ‘forcing the weak to be free’. This historical fact is however no argument 
that positive liberty is meaningless, nor does it infer a necessary connection to particular forms 
of government. Though the absence of interferences in the form of individual rights is a 
necessary aspect of what it means to be free, Taylor argues that the concept on its own has 
absurd consequences that connects to its inability to tell us why freedom is valuable, which is 
found within the modern ideal of authenticity I mentioned earlier. Since the modern individuals 
seek to realize itself and find fulfilment, an absence of interferences is not in itself valuable 
unless he is able to act in purposeful ways, which requires a moral background that guides his 
investigation. To the extent that positive liberty connects with our state of mind as self-directed 
and self-determined individuals, it does not rely on divisions between a higher or lower self, 
but rather between the qualitative contrasts we invoke when judging our own motivations as 
strong evaluators (ibid, 222-224)  
This is why freedom is not something that can be quantified on the basis of how many 
hindrances we face, but rather whether these impediments encroach on the significant about 
being human. If freedom were only the absence of interferences, it would follow that a society 
can be more or less free than another on the basis of trivial hindrances such as traffic regulations, 
and to insist on this would deprive its meaning. To live in a free society, I need certain 
guarantees that allow me to express my personhood and this is why the pursuit of the purposeful 
is  not impeded by traffic regulations, but rather by authoritarian modes that hinder my ability 
to participate in social and cultural activities or the liberty to express myself and travel freely 
without risking arbitrary arrest. These are the serious limitations of freedom which express acts 
of great injustice, because they impede on the things we need to live a good life. There are no 
straight answers on what the meaning of positive freedom should have on our political 
arrangements, the same way there is no necessary connection between the advocacy level of 
political theory with Taylor’s holistic ontology. To claim that a free society is one where 




from the question of what is just, and what the state should do, which place the question of 
liberty against other considerations (ibid, 225). 
While these considerations clarify many of Taylor’s approaches into political theory in general, 
it specifically has relevancy into his understanding of republicanism.7 This is because there is 
a historical connection between positive liberty and republican conception of democracy as 
self-rule. Though these conceptions are distinct from one other, they do relate partially. The 
genesis of this connection lies in combing the insights of Kant’s conception of individual 
freedom, and Rousseau’s account of political freedom, both of which operate with a notion of 
freedom as self-government. For Kant, the free individual is one who is self-determined by 
living according to his self-imposed moral law against his natural inclinations. For Rousseau, 
the free citizen is one who can be the author of his own laws, and thus lives according to his 
own will rather than the will of others in the state of nature, or the will of the unconstrained 
monarch. In both cases, freedom is linked to the effective determination of the direction of how 
one aspires to live. However, Taylor does think that freedom as self-direction and self-control 
can sometimes depend on others acting in concert as there is a sense in which self-rule, or self-
government, connects with freedom as the ability to give shape to one’s own community, and 
as something that express common meaning of a higher form of life (Taylor 1985b, 212, 318-
320). 
4.4 Is liberalism ahistorical? 
The force of the liberal argument against communitarian depiction of liberal theory, Caney 
(1992) thinks, is that liberalism more than any other ideology has fostered various communities 
through individual rights that guarantee free expression and free associations, which has 
proliferated various forms of community, in line with the recognition that culture is fluid and 
dynamic. A civil society wherein various communities are allowed to flourish depend on the 
very rights liberals defend in order to preserve its integrity (ibid, 285). 
 Have liberals ever explicitly denied the social thesis Taylor’s contrasts their view with? The 
fact that the autonomous individual will always be situated within culture is not incompatible 
 




observations from a normative point of view, since the former depend on ideas to live by 
through critical examination of things that matter to them, and which things that merits 
revaluation. Liberal theory has always been motivated by the attempt to shield individuals from 
conformist, intolerant and homogenic forms of living, which is why the social-contract 
methodology assumes a pre-social person in order to evaluate social norms and propose ideas 
about legitimate authority. Caney argues that we can distinguish between individual’s personal 
identity, and their moral personality, and claim that universal claims and impartiality concerns 
our moral nature, without inferring that the self as a person is not attached to his values and 
relationships. The motivation here, as within classical contract theory, is precisely because 
social attachments and moral views are so important to individuals that they should not affect 
their entitlements within a political sphere they share with others who hold different views. The 
methodological inference from cultural ignorance, in order to dissect political principles, is 
needed to protect everybody’s interests in their own personal autonomy. This does not involve 
the view that individuals can articulate their fundamental pursuits in life independent from their 
social situation, on the contrary, a well-ordered society is founded and justified through the 
very fact that individual interests rely on various forms of institutions (ibid, 278-279).  
Part of Taylor’s criticism of liberal understanding of individual rights is that they are defended 
in distance from the social domain of the self which implies that individual identity is something 
we can approach in existentialist terms where culture and personality are things we can pick 
out of our own choosing, which undermines the historical sources behind our own identity. 
However, the problem with Taylor’s social thesis of individual embeddedness is his 
interchangeable reference to identity in both the metaphysical meaning, the conditions of an 
objects identical existence over time, and in the psychological meaning of self-understanding. 
This is problematic because we are only embedded persons in the psychological notion of 
identity. The social thesis cannot be a claim about what a person is, but what shapes it, given 
that changing beliefs and commitments are not at odds with personal identity in the 
metaphysical sense  Though it matters that we are partially embedded in social domains, Taylor 
does not deny that we are able to distance ourselves from practices we disvalue. Yet, often it 
can be hard to read what distinguishes partial from complete embeddedness if there’s aspects 
of identity beyond revaluation. There are always ideals in a culture whose interpretation can be 
changed, without people distancing themselves from it. Though we can never change where we 




Another ambiguity in Taylor’s theory of the self lies between whether it is a sociological 
observation, or a teleological aspect of human development and human history. Though Taylor 
rejects that obligations and norms can be upheld through the notion that they are part of a 
rationalizing developing order, he does maintain that traditions and norms have a certain 
authority over us in that they are the domains we must look to find meaning, and that 
significance is something we discover within the horizon of meaning, yet never invent on our 
own as if something had value simply because it was chosen. There is something self-defeating 
in the idea that we can question every aspect of our social situation, since this would eliminate 
all background understandings of value that motivate us to live in accordance with our character 
and purposes. The radically free self is one that exercises his capacity of reason to do away with 
strong evaluations, yet this is impossible. We are only free as a situated self and this cannot 
involve questioning all self-understandings and presupposition under the guise of rational self-
determination. If this were possible, we would have no content to direct our way in the myriad 
of opportunities. Some aspects of what is given to us are constitutive aspects of our identity, 
and the exercise of liberty is conditioned on our horizon of meanings, that make choices 
intelligible and purposeful (Taylor 1992, 30-40). 
Caney (1992) argues that liberal theory is neither ignorant nor unable to recognize our partial 
embedded situation, without admitting that this ought to change our understanding of 
autonomy. To the extent that traditions or cultures are meaningful, then we can assume people 
will choose to live by them. In this way, commitments to individual autonomy is not coupled 
with ahistorical and distanced conception from people’s situations, nor does it involve the 
existentialist claim that we can step outside our own experience and construct our ties from a 
baseline position (ibid, 277). For Kymlicka (1988), the error in Taylor’s argument is that it 
builds on the assumption that liberals must value freedom intrinsically, as alluded to above. 
Instead we value freedom exactly because, as Taylor says, we can form relationships and 
commitments that matter to us, and this meaning depends on a continuity of how we have 
decided to live in accordance with who we are (ibid, 187-188). 
The real question instead concerns the extent to which society serves the function of setting 
guidelines or ends of things we come to value. If we think that some ends are given, we must 
inquire where they come from and ask whether their source lies in embedded values or 




roles in a community? According to Kymlicka, communitarians to often conflate situated 
freedom with the situated individual. For him, the value of liberty stems from the purposes we 
can pursue where we choose our ends on accord of our own individual judgments and 
understanding of the various alternatives. Therefore, no ends are authoritative on their own 
without individual affirmation of its value. The only aspects of ourselves that are ‘given’ is 
what gives us the reason to choose, since it will be different for different people and vary as we 
get older. Though it is externally influenced, it is internally ‘set’. Taylor’s argument against 
radical freedom is flawed because he does not show that the ‘given’ are horizons of the 
community. The fact that communal values are objects of an individual’s critical reflection does 
not amount to an empty view of the self (ibid, 188-190). 
By affirming that the social is concern for the political we must take account of the dangerous 
coercive potential that follows from such authority. In the same way, Kymlicka (1989) 
recognizes that liberals have neglected the fact that pluralism cannot be taken for granted. A 
free society is the product of history, giving rise to a culture that values freedom, and as a 
historical achievement it can be threatened either because of the lack of critical reflection from 
our practices, or because people are to attach to their cultural practices. A culture of freedom 
needs both attachment and critical distance in mixture (ibid, 899). 
For Taylor, the content of a society’s conception of the good is based on civic deliberations, 
they themselves have to decide what is valuable, and it is a mistake to construe the state as 
neutral with regards to their social practices. While he is aware of the danger of oppression in 
cultural reinforcement, the tensions in Taylor’s answers on these questions follows from his 
wider attempt to reconcile freedom with belonging, and how cultural norms and practices 
express something meaningful about humans, even though they might be problematic. Part of 
Kymlicka’s criticism against Taylor’s train of thought concerns the danger of rewarding those 
that are articulate, at the expense of those who are not gifted in the pursuit of collective 
deliberations of what values they hold onto. Many values or practices are not properly 
understood by others, and many have been deliberatively excluded. It is unfair to demand that 
people ought to participate in this endeavor, it is best to leave them free to articulate who they 
are in relation to family and friends in ways they can be understood rather than being succumbed 




in ways that hinder natural social change, that might be called for by a sizable minority (ibid, 
901). 
There is value to the communitarian idea that a culture’s history and structure matters for 
evaluation of what is a common good, but these ideas are the partial products of elitist 
definitions and majoritarian stories that influence how debate about what is valuable proceeds. 
In contrast, liberal neutrality is worthwhile because its inclusive and allows minorities to 
associate on their own terms against majority practices and definitions. If we instead demand 
that minorities, through public domains of deliberations, ought to defend their ideals of the good 
life, given the linger threat of state coercion, such a practice would be exclusive. This danger 
cannot be avoided, especially given the oppressive history that exists in different societies 
across the world. It is this relationship between state and society which necessitates neutrality. 
The liberal social thesis is very much aware that relationships and domains of interactions are 
formed by individuals in order for them to articulate what they consider valuable, they simply 
argue that the state is not needed to provide this domain, but rather will distort the natural social 
process. It is rather communitarians who implicitly think atomism and singular individualism 
is what will happen if social deliberation is not put into a context of politics (ibid, 904). 
5. The moral field 
Taylor’s claims that procedural models of liberalism and democracy build on a ‘narrow’ 
understanding of morality, evident through the supposed fact that they shy away from questions 
of the good in favour of neutral decision procedures that claim to offer reasonable guides on 
how to organize political life. For Taylor, morality is a broad term that refers to more than just 
what is right to do, but what kind of person it is good to be. The moral refers to the background 
meanings that inform the judgments individuals have when making a choice. If all our 
deliberations as agents consisted of means/end reasoning on the basis of value-neutral 
preferences, which he thinks classical liberalism implies, we would be simple weigher of 
alternatives. In reality, the questions we ask about individual rights or the nature of the good 
life are shaped by how our strong evaluations are connected to different moral questions that 
depend on each other. The reason why people deserve equal rights, and why people deserve 
respect, are couched in a wide moral ontology of what we consider good. When we articulate 




or define rights, liberties, or obligations, we are engaged in articulation of the framework of 
goods that make these judgments intelligible. To know yourself is to know your relationship to 
questions of value and the moral compass that guides your judgments when making a choice. 
This moral horizon is part of our agency as individuals, and part of our background as political 
theorists when we propose principles for social organization that reflect what we consider 
valuable (Taylor 1989, 20-27, 65-69). 
Instead, the attempt to be neutral via disguising strong evaluations and the plurality of goods, 
the moral field is undermined. As Taylor sees it, all ethics of what it is right to do will implicitly 
rely on unarticulated conceptions of what is good, which is why giving absolute priority to the 
former whenever a conflict emerges, will undermine the plurality of goods that matter in an 
individual’s life. Moral goods like personal integrity, rational capabilities, or autonomy are all 
expressions of what many understand as integral aspects of living a good life and how we define 
ourselves. The diverse set of goods that matter for people cannot be reduced to singular, 
quantifiable notions of preferences as this would undermine the qualitative nature that informs 
us of ethically relevant considerations that should matter in political theory. For example, within 
an individual life, a person might be committed to both family life, and aspirations of a career, 
both of which pull against each other without rendering the other invalid by making a choice 
(Taylor 1985b, 235-245). 
Taylor thinks that neutral decision procedures that make no reference to the good will narrow 
morality by privileging some goods we value, that they implicitly build on, such as utility or 
equal respect for human capacities, at the expense of questions of what it is good to be; as these 
questions are more vulnerable to the charge of relativism, when in fact both routes invoke 
qualitative views. As such, many goods that matter are subordinated to the supposedly rational 
and impartial demands that claim absolute priority whenever a conflict between the good and 
the right emerges. When important questions are only asked within the framework of what is 
right to do, we neglect how answers rely on the wider field of morality that inform us why 
human beings are worthy of respect and dignity, why this imposes obligations on us, and how 
we find meaning in life. To understand why someone is motivated to act in a certain way, or 
why a society upholds individual rights, we must investigate the background of meanings 
embedded within their cultural ideas about what it is good to be. Whereas ancient forms of 




establishment of correct judgments of the good, modern notions of reasons are instead judged 
by how we think, regardless of whether the outcome is correct. In addition, modern ethics 
rejects qualitative distinctions as the basis for moral judgments by reducing their importance 
down to ‘basic reasons’. Instead of viewing good behavior in line with our aspiration to be a 
honest or brave people, modern ethics instead tell us to act in accordance with moral principle 
like the categorical imperative, the Kantian idea that we should act in accordance with 
universalizable rules that treat humans as ends in themselves, or some utilitarian calculus that 
informs us to act in ways that produce the most pleasure for the greatest number (Taylor 1989, 
85-86). 
These basic reasons, Taylor thinks, disguise rather than illuminate their own strong evaluations 
that makes their ethic meaningful, for example that a good life is lived autonomously or 
maximizing utility, and therefore they cannot explain in which way these things are goods that 
define a way of living in qualitative higher contrasts to other forms of life. The reason why we 
can respect basic reasons that tell us why we should not hurt or steal from others is because we 
have a conception of why human life is valuable. Without invoking these judgments, we cannot 
explain why people are owed impartial concern, and following in this train of thought 
eventually leads to moral reasoning that do not have grounding in people’s actual motivation 
and our commitment to impartiality falls short. When we articulate what lies behind our 
intuitions or our choices, we make use of these distinctions to spell out what we consider 
valuable, and why we act as we do.  Modern ethics is attractive to people because they express 
implicit ideas about the good life that inform our strong evaluations, either because we find it 
worthy to reduce suffering and satisfy as many preferences as possible, or live an autonomous 
life of freedom and self-control, but neither can affirm these substantive conceptions without 
undermining the primacy of the right above the good. Neither approach can reach full agency 
since this would involve critical examination of one’s framework that render ethical judgment 
meaningful. If we only focus on the mutual obligations ethics imposes on us amidst our own 
judgments, we fail to consider that the imposition of ethical demands presupposes that we are 
motivated via our conception of the good to abide by its demands. When we criticize established 
institutions, practices, and way of life, this goes via our strong evaluative framework in some 




This is the background that informs Taylor’s criticism of ‘procedural’ theories of liberalism. 
First because we cannot really distinguish between the right and the good, and second, in the 
attempt to do so, we give precedence to a singular principle that reflect one commitment, at the 
expense of the diversity of goods that matter for us. Their way of reasoning undermines these 
goods by subordinating them to universal demands that tell us that whenever they conflict, the 
right overrides all other considerations. In this way, the qualitative distinction is reduced into 
action-guiding principles that disguise their own substantive commitments. The priority of the 
right above the good, cannot without error articulate their own foundation. If political principles 
have lexical priority over other considerations that matter in human live, and are justified as 
instrumentally valued goods rather than intrinsic goods, we lose hold of the fact that liberal 
principles are worthy of respect, such as freedom of speech and association, because they are 
essential parts of what we consider a qualitatively better way of living than others, in the same 
way that we value democracy not only because we want to accommodate our private interests 
in a fair manner, but also because we consider a life where men rule themselves qualitatively 
better than one lived under an enlightened despot (ibid, 76-80, 155-160). 
5.1 Individual rights and strong evaluations 
A liberal society has different goals, such as the rule of right, an open public sphere, without 
one or the other being the exclusive feature worthy of extensive interpretation in isolation from 
the others. We should recognize that liberal societies take care of these aims in various ways, 
without letting go of the fact that some fundamental rights will always trump the concerns of 
community given that they express a moral core of humanity whose claim to validity stretches 
across different cultures. Beyond this, we should let go of the pretension that some societies are 
not liberal just because they might not have the same wide understanding of how rights weigh 
against other concerns, for example cultural or welfare goods (Taylor 1995, 247, 287). 
Both with regards to civil liberties, as well as redistributive material arrangements that instruct 
the political economy under notions of equality and fairness, a certain political culture express 
its own strong evaluations and the qualitative discriminations between a higher or lower form 
of society, that is the common expression of how a society thinks it is good to be, and how the 




has a right to something, our statement is only intelligible within a culture that understands the 
value of that thing. He writes that  
“our notion of human dignity is in turn bound up with a conceptions of the human good, 
that is, our answer to the question, what is the good for man? This too is part of the 
background of a conception of distributive justice. […] related to conceptions of the 
human good and to different notions of men’s dependence on society to realize the good. 
Thus deep disagreements about justice can only be clarified if we formulate and 
confront the underlying notions of man and society.” (Taylor 1985b, 291). 
This help us to understand the differences of interpretation within principles of justice and tell 
us that normative political principles cannot be distinguished from investigations of the human 
subject. Within political theory we find ideas about human agency in the full sense, and the 
dignity we accord to people to have their human capacities respected and sustained. When we 
assert the right to free speech, we say that there’s something deeply important for humans given 
their capacities as rational beings to say and do what they want on the basis of their own 
articulation of what is valuable. This also places us in a political dilemma in relation to those 
whose cultural self-understanding are not as willing to accept the universal validity of this right 
if their moral horizon is radically different from our own. If we understand rights in this way, 
we go beyond the mere consequentialist justification for certain goods in relation to the good 
life. Instead, rights are much more substantial given that they are intelligible within a cultural 
background of what it means to be a person, which capacities we associate with selfhood, and 
how they are indispensable in living a good life. This poses a challenge for us to balance 
different interests and capacities that we associate with human dignity. Just by asserting that 
some rights are inalienable does not put an end to the many public contestation we have in 
society given the competing nature of different goods based on our self-understanding. There 
is no formula that can put an end to these disputes simply by weighing different individual 
rights against each other. Rights are necessary in that they protect important things about 
humans, but appealing to rights will neither answer nor account for the nature involved in 
various socio-political disputes (Taylor 1985b, 302) 




According to Kymlicka (1991), Taylor misunderstands the structure of modern moral-political 
theory, in so far as moral questions in the broad sense has been replaced rather than suppressed. 
While questions of the good do serve the motivational function Taylor attributes to them, they 
belong in the private sphere. Taylor’s account on moral agency does not imply that we can 
reject the priority of the right above the good, because the principle is not conditioned on a 
denial of the qualitative difference between forms of life, but instead the commitment to 
impartiality. Given modern diversity, a commitment to impartiality is a moral point of view 
that gives all persons due recognition of ends in themselves with the entitlement to equal 
consideration of their interests. This is why moral acts are those that are impartially justifiable 
in ways that embody equal concern This concern go back to the ancient idea that we are all 
children of God, but as moderns we give different answers on what people’s interests are, and 
what it means to offer equal consideration to them. Modern morality is united via the claim that 
morality involves impartial treatment of interests, however we define it, which does not 
marginalize qualitative goods but on the contrary welcomes a discussion about what they are 
(ibid, 159-161). 
Though we might be mistaken about our own ends, the answer lies within each persons, which 
is why the condition that enable us to reevaluate our commitments are so important. These 
‘discovery procedures’, seek to establish conditions that allow continuous re-evaluation of our 
judgments. To make this realistic, one has to abstract away from particular ends to find what 
the pursuit of the good requires. This could be done via ‘thin theories of the good’, where neutral 
resources are justified by guaranteeing individuals to make use of, in the same manner that 
Taylor describes, the qualitative distinctions to conceive moral judgments in the broad sense. 
The commitments to instrumental, procedural, reason, does not mean that this is how we live a 
good life. Further, there will always be qualitative distinctions that underlie basic reasons. 
People are worthy of the impartial concern they recommend because we all have the same 
capacity for reason, or the ability to experience pain and pleasure (ibid). 
Taylor complains that procedurally produced obligations will undermine or override 
conceptions of the good, which is most problematic when, for example, individual rights are 
defined in extensive terms and treated as an ‘all or nothing matter’, without room for prudence 
in the face of collective goals or particular forms of life, connected to a community’s 




to acknowledge that some rights are more important than others and that we ought not always 
to insist on their imposition when they threaten significant goods. Here, procedural morality 
imposes itself in unrealistic ways without recognition of commitments to friends and family for 
example, which is at odds with the insistence on neutral impartiality (Taylor 1989). 
Kymlicka points out that just because the normative judgments that modern moral-political 
thinking builds on are not explicitly illuminated, there is no hindrance against articulating them. 
To suggest that they cannot do this is misleading, since there is a difference between general 
and particular conceptions of the good. In liberal theory, the background judgments that give 
credence to the lexical priority of the right is general in that it guides our thinking about which 
conditions best enables individuals to determine and pursue particular conceptions. The 
motivation to articulate rights and obligations in impartial terms is not because they want to 
marginalize questions of the good, but rather because the very purpose of “sustaining ways of 
life that citizens can affirm as worthy” where “justice draws the limit, the good shows the point” 
(Kymlicka 1991, 168).  
This is why Taylor’s emphasis that institutions must be intelligible for humans in their search 
for meaning seems to talk past the implicit meaning liberals think a priority of the right 
expresses. Since we can assume that individuals are naturally interested in the conception of 
the good life, the purpose of moral-reasoning ought to concern itself with providing reasons 
why others are entitled to respect for their views. Thus, Taylor misunderstands the ‘division of 
labour’ that modern moral-political theory operates with. Crucially, Taylor’s conception of 
morality breaks with our modern vocabulary. We intuitively think of immoral persons or 
societies as those who infringe on the rights of others, not those who live poor or unimaginative 
lives. This is where Taylor argues that without illuminating substantive commitments we have 
for others; morality cannot offer reasons for why people must abide by obligations. If people 
are not are not able to act on the basis of moral prescripts, what value do they have? The 
illustration of required actions that follow from basic reasons are insufficient if agents are 
unable to recognize the obligation as an aspect of the moral field. If we are living beyond the 





Even if we agree with Taylor that morality cannot take place in complete abstraction from the 
actual lives that people live, is there not sometimes reason to insist that this is irrelevant for the 
validity of moral prescripts? Kymlicka mentions as an example the uncontested claim that non-
whites in apartheid South-Africa had moral entitlements of equal citizenship, a claim 
independently legitimate from considerations of whether the white population would be 
“willing to accept and empowered upon” to act in accordance with the obligation. Another 
example could be the entitlements to redistribution people in the global south are owed. If this 
claim has impartial validity it does not depend on whether those who are obliged to fulfill the 
obligation are willing to comply with the command. There are many examples in history where 
turning to violence was necessary to institute what is right given the lack of others recognition 
of their claim. Failure to see this point on Taylor’s account of morality in effect is limiting “the 
scope of human rights to what privileged people can be motivated to be or do is to offer a 
cramped, conservative, view of morality” (ibid, 174). 
Contrary to Taylor’s claim that impartial reasoning sacrifice goods that matter for our identity, 
such as family or traditional ways of living, Kymlicka argues that their value is independent 
from the dictates of moral prescripts. Since modernity is diverse and people hold different 
goods, impartiality matters in order to adjudicate when conflict arises. In turn, impartiality is 
justified in reference to our substantive commitments to human dignity due to our sentient 
nature as being beings with the capacity of reason and moral conscience. If modern morality is 
narrowed because it cannot empower people to comply, why should this change anything? The 
aim of morality is to provide reasons for how to act on the assumption that we all have an 
interest in living a good life, that impartiality matters, and that morality is demanding in ways 
that transcends consent. This is why procedural models do not need reference to the good, but 
rather catering to common interests, which implicitly builds on qualitative distinctions of the 
higher and admirable things in life (ibid, 179). 
Is this really the implications of Taylor’s position? It seems that we could interpret what it 
means to be morally empowered to do, differently than what Kymlicka here does, by invoking 
a difference between what a person, as a human being, is capable of recognizing on the basis 
of his self-understanding, and how he currently understands himself. The fact that legal equality 
amongst all South Africans today exists shows that people were unable at a certain time, given 




rights violations around the world where it is uncontroversial to claim that people’s self-
understanding have to be changed in order to institute what is right, it is another thing to say 
state-sanctioned imposition, or violence, is something we ought to do. Taylor’ thinks that 
Kymlicka, by recognizing that conceptions of the good have their significance independent of 
subjective affirmation, make little use of it. He distinguishes between ‘life goods’ and 
‘constitutive goods’. While ordinary life goods include ideas about the good life, constitutive 
goods are the overarching inspirations that lowers all other goods, which can have religious or 
secular foundation. He claims that moral theorists ought consider the significance of these 
goods as the foundation for human motivation since they cannot be as easily separated as 
Kymlicka claims, since they are  
"features of the universe, or God, or human beings, (i) on which the life goods depend, 
(ii) which command our moral awe or allegiance, and (iii) the contemplation of or 
contact with which empowers us to be good. In virtue of (iii) such constitutive goods 
function as what I call 'moral sources'. Examples of candidates for constitutive goods 
available in the tradition are: God, Plato’s Idea of the Good, Kant's power of rational 
agency, which commands the awe of the agent him/herself". (Taylor 1991, 243) 
The fact that moral prescripts and goods conflict as much as they do makes it irrational to give 
unconditional precedence to one over the other. The temptation to do so follows from the flawed 
view that “all issues of fairness were equally vital and grave, and issues of the good life equally 
secondary. But that is not the way it is in life […] this search for across-the-board principles 
seems to me to fly in the face of elementary facts of human life” (ibid, 244). Sometimes the 
questions between these two sphere vary in significance and must be treated accordingly when 
weighed against each other. When we realize that someone lives beyond their moral means, 
should not a priori rule out considerations whether moderation is appropriate.  
To suggest instead that morality demands coercion is to hint that this is always the answer when 
people are unable to consent with supposed obligations, rather than looking for solutions that 
take people’s self-understandings seriously. Given that some injustices are more serious than 
others, it is unwise to insist on universal principles that equalized their significance when 
insisting on coercion can break up “community spirit, friendship, or traditional identity” (ibid, 




are meant to be applied in. Suggesting otherwise overlooks the destructive consequences 
foreign imposition and coercion in the name of justice can and have had on communities. The 
contours of ethical life ought to advise us to weigh prudently between the good, the right and 
people’s interests, which speaks against Kymlicka’s division of labour. Without knowing a 
priori when something trumps the other, Kymlickas proceduralism does not pay “enough 
attention to the good to determine whether and when the moral principles they offer ought to 
be modified to accommodate its demands.” (Ibid, 245). 
Beyond the claim that liberalism ought to moderate its universalist claims when political 
prudence speaks in favor of investigating people’s self-understanding, we also see why Taylor 
does not believe that neutrality, when taken to its logical conclusion, is coherent. The level of 
political advocacy will always be informed by the moral field, even though it is justified in 
impartial terms. Different forms of family policy are one example. The argument that different 
taxation schemes and welfare arrangements can be neutral because they are justified as a mere 
distribution of resources based on choices of individuals, disguises the fact that the state has an 
agenda evident in its own incentives to foster some forms of living it thinks is valuable, and 
which reflects citizens different conception of the diversity of goods. The reason why right- and 
left-wing governments argue for different forms of family policies is not merely because they 
have different understandings of what is fair, but because their judgments about fairness is 
informed by their values and their ideas about what a family is, and should be. The very 
definition of family is also political and can always have its legal recognition challenged for 
being non-neutral. There is no way that the state takes a neutral position on what it is and 
deserves to have which is why, according to Taylor “neutral liberalism is an angelic view, 
unconnected to the real world in which democracies function” (Abbey 1996, 5).   
6. The free republic 
How can government be neutral with regards to the distinct culture that different communities 
adhere to, under the banner of protecting them, without affirming their worth? If the liberal 
democratic aspiration of popular sovereignty is rule by the people for the people, in what way 
does it make sense to issue no judgments of their own culture’s conception of the good life? 
From Taylor’s idea that there can be irreducible common goods we get the idea that a liberal 




culture and language. In order to sustain a liberal polity, there is a need for some social cohesion 
founded on loyalty and patriotism toward its own dictates.  
It is in this context that Taylor argues that a political unit needs some sort of collective identity 
founded on its historical experience, in order to enjoy legitimacy, which is the precondition of 
social cohesion and stability in the face of social turmoil. Belonging to a political society can 
only be reconciled with freedom if it manifests a common purpose or common identity as a 
democratic, historically situated unit. For him, this cannot be a convergent good, but an 
expressive aspect of common appreciation of the fact that citizens share a polity with others 
because they recognize democracy as a higher form of life that express our mutual dignity as a 
self-ruling people. The countries we recognize as liberal are not properly neutral in the strict 
sense that liberal theory describes since many of them do take an active part in the civil sphere, 
and uphold cultural practices as a common goal against market dynamics that threaten to erode 
things people value but cannot acquire on their own, or depend on others to appreciate. The 
historical unit is a source of identity and its patriotic dynamic cannot be accounted for without 
recognizing irreducible social goods. As Taylor sees it, the classical ‘atomic’ liberal conception 
of democracy fails to accommodate that citizens are not calculating rational actors who think 
of politics as an instrument towards their own material needs, but instead cast their vote in 
alignment of their visions of what kind of society they think is meaningful to aspire to (Taylor 
1995, 260-270). 
Habermas (1994), however, argues that this depiction is a strawman of liberal theory. It is not 
the case that rights do not express the common history of the polity it emerges from and applies 
to, nor is it the case that laws will not express a distinct form of life that citizens can recognize 
as their own, and as such, as an extended aspect of their own identity. While Habermas defends 
the liberal tenet that a concern with diversity forbids us from instituting substantial values that 
serve as an overarching consensus of popular contestation, the laws of the polity are still 
legitimate in the eyes of citizens because they have been subjected to legislative procedures that 
invariantly will connect to their public conceptions of how they understand themselves as 
citizens and a people. Habermas agrees with Taylor that civic integration of individuals, in 
order to secure social cohesion, cannot be secured via the mechanisms of the market economy 
or the rule of law that the administrative state upholds, unless we make sure that the different 




sphere and the legislature, that can serve as a source for patriotism as a distinct understanding 
of who they are as a people. By investigating aspects of Habermas deliberative theory of 
democracy we can see how some procedural theories of democracy aims to reconcile 
conceptions of the good with principles of the right.. Since Habermas defines his model as a 
third alternative to both liberal and republican conception of democracy, we can also shed light 
on ideal aspects of republicanism that inspires Taylor (ibid, 112). 
6.1 Three models of democracy 
In an ideal typology, the difference between liberalism and republicanism can be drawn 
between their understanding of law and freedom, and their understanding of civic virtues. 
Whereas republicans traditionally understand freedom as a social status citizens enjoy in 
democratic settings marked by equal relations, liberals locate freedom in individuals natural 
rights, where law is a necessary impetus rather than a condition. Classical liberals have often 
viewed democracy through the lens of market dynamics, which is why they have been less 
concerned about the need for public virtues given that the aggregation of individual preferences 
in both politics and market will produce the common good (Pettit 1993, 162). 
While negative conceptions have mostly been associated with the liberal traditions, the positive 
conception has been associated with republicanism. On Pettit’s understanding, the republican 
conception of freedom is actually a clarification of what negative liberty consists in, which he 
labels freedom as non-domination. Here, the absence of interferences is a guarantee that 
requires more than the actual lack of invasion in one’s life. To be free from domination is the 
status the free citizen of the republic enjoys given that he lives in a democratic regime founded 
on the rule of law, which closely aligns to the formulation I attributed to Rousseau above. It 
tells us that we are only negatively free to the extent that we are protected from possible 
interferences, given that a benevolent dictator might dictate interventions in the life of citizens 
without due cause, putting us at constant risk. To uphold the republic, it is important that 
citizens are committed to the democratic values of the state in order to defend them in times of 
turmoil. Liberals have traditionally been inclined to view law as a necessary constraint on 
liberty justified by the overall freedom it guarantees, while republicans think law is the 
constitution of liberty, where law can only erode on liberty if they erode significant aspects of 




there can be no freedom since this is the domain where equality between different people is 
established via the citizenship that protects us from the dominance of others (ibid, 166-175). 
Habermas model of the deliberative democracy is defended as a third alternative motivated by 
valuable insights within each model in order to meet the critique that neutral liberalism is 
culturally empty. On a correct understanding liberal democracy, Taylor’s communitarian 
inspired critique is not only misleading, but fails to recognize how some questions must be kept 
at a distance from each other within the democratic system. Whereas liberals have traditionally 
viewed the political domain as foundation of collective goals via aggregation of interests in 
accordance with constitutional constraints of legislative procedures, republicans have elevated 
this domain as a third source for civic integration, beyond law and markets, by fostering a sense 
of social unity and self-determination of what kind of society they want to live in (Habermas 
1994, 5). 
The fact that citizens are able to stand outside the prerogatives of law and markets, means that 
their relationships cannot be reduced to mere conflict and competition, but also one of meaning. 
This is why republicans take issue with the classical liberal claim that political rights and 
political participation is just another avenue for the pursuit of private interests via the channels 
of democracy, and also why they are less inclined to elevate negative liberty as a foundational 
axiom given that all law must emerge from the public’s concerns and their self-determination, 
where freedom is equated with the ability to live under the laws one has drafted for oneself. 
Here, social autonomy does not precede politics via metaphysical notions of natural rights but 
emerges out of the democratic process as a legitimizing force of the state apparatus via the 
recognition that rights depends on a public that values democracy. Republicanism thus seeks to 
institutionalize positive freedom in the collective sense of what it means to be self-determined, 
which merits that the state must sustain inclusive domains of deliberations that can give shape 
and direction to the common goals of the polity. Habermas agrees with Taylor that the political 
process, cannot be reduced to the traditional liberal reduction of citizens as rational actors 
engaged in strategic pursuit of power, since political legitimacy is more than a quantification 
of aggregated preferences. Republicans better capture the ancient meaning that democracy tries 
to institutionalize our capacity of reason as a common exercise, which is why a legitimate 
legislature must aim to transform interests and opinions via domains of deliberation with the 




articulated in complete isolation, but through dialogue with others, and this process ought to 
continue within the channels engaged in instituting the political direction of the polity. The 
classical liberal model falsely assumes that interests, meaning, and values are already 
articulated (ibid, 6-7). 
However, Habermas takes issue with the communitarian reading of republican insights, which 
he sees as the supplementary claim that self-determination of democratic discourse consists of 
constructing a common identity through a homogenic view of the civil sphere. The purpose of 
political participation is not articulation of a community’s collective identity, as this overlooks 
the liberal insight that we are strategic, competitors as well. There are limits of which 
expectations we can attribute to citizens ethical commitments to the common good compared 
to his private interests. It is too naïve to insist that legitimacy of political power must depend 
on some common ethos of the polity that rational discourse and processes of bargaining follows 
from, as there is no necessary binding between the dialogical functions of democracy and a 
community bound together by a common substantive ethic (ibid) 
It is this connection that Taylor promotes, as a binding between democratic self-determination 
as a worthy form of life and a community’s history, which creates the conception of the good 
that renders law intelligible and in line with one’s own aspiration as a citizen. The common 
exercise that is politics can enable the individual to understand his own embeddedness with 
others in a historically situated unit, and further enables him to better articulate his own identity 
in virtue of his community’s self-understanding given that identity is in part the product of the 
traditions in which it emerges. For Habermas, this undermines that the legislature is more than 
a domain to explore shared values, it is also an institute to guarantee peace and equal autonomy 
for all individuals. This is why, even though questions of the good take place within liberal 
democracy, they will always be constrained by dictates of the right, or in Habermas vocabulary, 
moral questions have priority over ethical questions since they regulate the democratic 
structure. Though Habermas agrees with Taylor that ethical questions are important because 
they spell out common understanding of various communities, the traditions they want to hold 
on, and which norms they think are worthy for who they are as a people, they are not the 
centerpiece of democracy, but only one discourse which stands on par with technical discourses 
that concern mean/end reasoning, and the overarching questions of justice that transcends 




commitment to freedom and equality for all requires some metric that protects minorities, 
without which democracy can undermine the autonomy of individuals who feel estranged by 
the collective self-understanding that the process produces. Moral questions are independent of 
the community’s understanding, yet at the same time they enable the reciprocal relationship 
between public and private autonomy. What this means is that without sufficient protection for 
the individual, there cannot be any overarching ethical understandings that bind people together 
since this presupposes that the discourses where these questions are deliberated are made of by 
the different understandings of identity that exists within the civil sphere. This is why 
communitarians overlook the dynamics of modern pluralism, where the state-sanctioned goals 
of the state always risk favoring some values or interests that do not align with the actual 
intersubjective understanding of the polity in its entirety (ibid, 8-9) 
Taylor’s claim that rights-oriented liberalism cannot accommodate the cultural significance of 
societies is a misunderstanding since liberalism recognizes that law must be constructed by the 
citizens themselves, not imposed on them without inputs and such the laws that pass through 
our legislative bodies will embody our public autonomy as authors of our own laws. Here, the 
connection between constitutional codes and democratic participation is not a ‘difference-blind’ 
liberalism given that citizens deliberate into “what respects equal things will be treated equally 
and unequal things unequally in any particular case” (Habermas 1994b, 113). 
There is no reason to retract from this framework in order to provide a common sense of unity, 
or to accommodate differentiated claims with regards to distinct communities. A legal order 
founded on modern law recognizes that law is formal, its existence lies within codified scripts, 
it recognizes individuals as the subjects of rights, and it is founded on the decisions of a 
representative legislature that is constrained by procedural formulas of how to implement new 
law in accordance with their popular mandate. Habermas is well aware that loyalty towards the 
system requires integration into the political culture. This would be futile if constitutional 
principles were abstract and distanced from the lived experience of citizens, but in fact political 
culture is formed by their own interpretation of their constitution on the basis of their own 
history, which is not neutral in the strict sense. A polity’s self-understanding will be formed by 
this “common horizon of interpretation” which is based on a distinction between two forms of 
integration, constitutional and sub-political communities with their own conceptions of the 




understandings into the state prerogative. The only common bonds beyond diverse communities 
is a consensus on legitimate law and power. Its universality is based on the ideal that it 
approaches consensus, against a political culture that is loyal to its constitution (ibid, 134-135). 
This is why rights-based liberalism is not an abstract universal that creates laws at a distance 
from the actual experience of citizens. He writes that “the more concrete the matter at hand, 
the more the self-understanding of a collectivity and its form of life […] are expressed in the 
acceptability of the way the matter is legally regulated” (ibid, 125). Since there are different 
ways we reason depending on the topic at hand, laws will be affected by various discourses, 
one of which concerns questions of the good life, culture, and identity. If the democratic process 
shapes individual rights in accordance with overarching conceptions of the good life, our 
private autonomy is threatened because it ends up fixating cultural understandings. Instead, 
conceptions of the good is only on aspect of the democratic process where citizens do in fact 
reflect on their form of life, what identity means for them, and most crucially, can reflect on 
which traditions they wish to reaffirm. 
The deliberative model Habermas proposes is one in which the process of the legislature is 
conditioned in such a way that it can balance and compromise among diverging interests so that 
it’s consistent with the collective good, while at the same time applying moral questions of 
universal justice onto the particular community with their own traditions and values. This model 
presupposes a certain view of society that merges the liberal market metaphor, and the 
republican reference to culture, without reducing itself to either one. Whereas republicans 
operate with a blurred distinction between state and society, liberals understand democracy as 
a bridge between the two; though constrained by individual rights and constitutional regulations 
that prohibits the concentration of power. In the deliberative model, we let go of the unrealistic 
notion that civic virtues are motivating enough to perform collective action, and concede that 
society is largely self-regulating outside the political domain without holding onto the idea that 
the common good will be produced via an invisible hand. Political participation is crucial aspect 
of self-determination, but we should not view the constitution of society as the legitimate 
product of deliberations, but rather the conditions that enable the process itself by 
institutionalizing deliberative domains that can institute state-sanctioned political will in 
connection to the political inputs from civil society and elections. Given that society is 




political will by being connected to various spheres of public influence in which people can 
participate (ibid, 8-12) 
The question of a sovereign self-determined citizenship cannot be understood through ideas 
about its intricateness with a social whole, nor on the basis of being atomic, isolated individuals. 
As an ideal, the democratic process produces decisions whose genesis lies within the public and 
its tested in legislative and judicial domains yet maintains that state and society are distinct 
domains. The legitimacy of the republic goes beyond the mere aggregation of votes and public 
justification where there needs to be broad procedures that can include various opinions and 
concerns that can be articulated and rationalized within the legislature. Habermas’ assumption 
is that in this way the administration’s ultimate mandate of implementation will be much better 
and rational than in their stead since decisions have been tested in line with the various 
discourses that steer the administration. The moral ideal of popular sovereignty must recognize 
the fact of pluralism which necessitates that it is only through legislative, executive, and 
juridical forms of power that the will and ideals of the competing, yet bounded people can 
manifest itself. Though there will be issues that affect everyone in society, society as such is 
not a ‘self’, as it cannot organize into a common will, which is why popular sovereignty must 
have an intersubjective interpretation (ibid, 12). 
6.2 Whose values? 
Is this a sufficient rebuttal of Taylor’s claim that neutral liberal democracy cannot affirm the 
culture of its own citizens? The unity that Habermas professes as sufficient for civic integration 
is a kind of constitutional patriotism where a diverse public will recognize themselves as 
distinct community through their own laws. Though Taylor can be partly vague about the 
distinct boundaries of individual rights, he is well aware of the dangers of pluralism, and do 
recognize that there are some fundamental rights that a community’s self-understanding never 
can thread upon. At the same time, he does not think that Habermas model is substantial enough 
to serve as a unifying source of patriotism given that its form insist that principles of the right 
must override particular conceptions of the good. Habermas’ discourse principle is meant to 
tell us which rules are valid depending on the political question at hand, which places 
constraints on the identity questions Taylor thinks are unavoidable. For him, questions of a 




placed within a discursive context and pretend that it can keep itself there respectfully abiding 
that it’s permanently subordinated to the conditions of the universal principles and expected to 
step aside as soon as a conflict emerges. As we have seen, this is not how human beings as self-
interpreters and strong evaluators work, as we operate with a moral field that is permanently 
there in all discourses in political life. To work as a foundation for strong evaluation it must 
touch on the basis of goods that are affirmed. If we were to ask why rational discussion is 
supposed to play its designated part, the answer reveals a strong evaluation, namely that those 
who are affected by law are entitled to have a say. The constitutive goods that lie behind the 
formula is what makes it an attractive idea for the contemporary liberal west, but would be 
unintelligible for a Platonic culture that subscribed to the idea that there’s an objective good for 
man and society independent from whatever people consent to in a deliberative sphere. It is this 
hyper-good that underlies the procedure which distinguishes between different questions and 
ranks them, and thus the vision of the good plays a role that the theory denies. In order to justify 
what we take to be a core morality we cannot operate with epistemological distinctions where 
that which is more easily agreed upon serves as a foundational axiom rather than ideas about 
good because: 
 “this kind of distinction is made […] by certain modern Western theories, notably 
Kantian ones: the rule of right can be distinguished from people’s conceptions […] of 
the good life (Habermas), and given a different more secure foundation (in reason itself, 
or the commitments involved in discourse, or whatever). But this distinction is internal 
to one historical view. One couldn’t ask […] people from other cultures altogether, to 
buy this radical distinction between the right and the good, or between definitions of 
rights and those of human flourishing”. (Taylor 1994, 247). 
This is the same train of thought that applies to Caney’s argument mentioned above, the idea 
that the methodology of political theory can operate with a distinction between personal identity 
and moral personality as a way to deduct universal principles. Though liberals can criticize the 
meaning Taylor attaches to this point, and claim that neutrality was never meant to be posited 




no one can deny is impossible8, the fact that our different self-understandings easily can lead to 
conflict is further argument for why imposition of the right must be cautioned against the actual 
lived lives of those it concerns. Habermas foundationalism of what the protection of private 
autonomy demands, such as free speech or free association, is premised on a thin understanding 
of a universal interest. It must therefore assume cultural convergence or work to establish it on 
the basis of cultural resources. When a core is given this special importance to always override 
other considerations then Habermas shares with the classical liberal theorists the idea that  
             “it is sufficient that one has grounded all that matters from a single source. This is     
             after all, what Kant and foundationalist thinkers after him, e.g. Habermas, claim to        
             do. There are other issues, […] e.g. what I and my culture consider a fulfilling life. But        
             the deliverances of a discourse ethic must take precedence over these. In other words,  
            we don’t ground everything, but we ground what trumps” (ibid, 248-249). 
6.3 Freedom and self-determination 
Taylor does not deny that Habermas discourse model cannot accommodate the need for various 
societies, he only protest the claim that is it can serve as a universal recipe for all societies, and 
that it cannot accommodate various goods that distinct societies want to live by. There is a 
plurality of different goods we need to affirm to sustain a liberal polity that reflects its form of 
life. This means that he protests the form his model rather than the content and simultaneously 
urges us to accept that it is better to build a kind of patriotism that recognize democracy as self-
government as a higher form of life. It expresses dignity we have as both rational and expressive 
beings, capable of discussing what kind of society we think it is valuable to live in. Abstract 
principles of the right, where a universalist demand of impartiality has absolute precedence is 
not something that can motivate people to fight for unless they see the freedom it stands for in 
connection to their way of life. By recognizing self-government as a good, there are 
consequences for our understanding of neutrality. He agrees that history should not be fixated 
on a singular interpretation that is imposed on peoples understanding, but he does claim that as 
a substantive value, self-government should be taught in schools as an ideal that a republic 
holds. This is a form on non-neutrality because many worldviews, including Christian sects in 
 




the West, hold political participation to be both irrelevant and unworthy pursuits. Here, unlike 
the moral discrimination of Macedo, Taylor is mentioning a “non-neutrality motivated by not 
by the commitment to the principle of neutral liberalism, but by another good, that of 
participatory, citizen self-rule”, which merits abandoning the strict application of neutrality 
(Taylor 1994, 252).  
Taylor defends a liberal model that can accommodate collective goods, and collective goals of 
a community, so long as these goods are not in violation with fundamental civil and political 
rights such as freedom of speech and the rule of law. The fact that some goods are irreducible, 
such as national identity, language, or self-government, since their value express a shared form 
of meaning, political life should not reduce these social attachments into instrumental 
arrangements. The liberal tendency to view all forms of patriotism as potentially dangerous is 
yet another reductive tendency to eradicate the different forms this kind of allegiance can take, 
where we ought to foster a civic patriotism that can ensure that citizens identity with their own 
political unit in order to preserve its fundamental commitment to human rights and the rule of 
law and democracy. We must recognize however, what true patriotism means, as it too often 
can be abused by those who rally around the flag to distract people from injustices. As 
Weinstock (1994) says, true patriotism must involve continuous challenge to that which is 
unjust or unfair, given that many movements that have been labelled ‘unpatriotic’ have been 
goods things insofar as the challenge the historical self-understanding of historical traditions 
and contribute to the continuous self-understanding of the polities claims and aspirations. A 
diverse community can only develop if the majority interpretations of its own history is 
challenged and not left alone to essentialize and freeze dominant understandings of its history. 
How a community imagines its own history is often contested and the various calls for civil 
rights by minority cultures or ethnicities have often been labelled as ‘unpatriotic’ when they in 
fact have been involved in exposing the hypocrisy that a political community’s understanding 
expresses. Patriotism can be a good thing so long as it includes references to those who in the 
name of liberty and justice challenge the polity’s dominant interpretation, since there are often 
political interests behind the perpetuation of a country’s story. Conflicts emerge if government 
goes too far to institute understandings of history on the basis of majority sentiments which is 
why a healthy society that commits itself to upholding free speech and association can 




7. Is liberalism blind to differences? 
The same motivation that lies behind Taylor’s criticism of neutral liberalism with regards to a 
polity’s self-understanding transfers into his views about multicultural politics, differentiated 
citizenship and the tenet that some cultural goods can be weighed against the insistence on a 
uniform imposition of rights without room for nuance. Taylor thinks that cultural survival is 
one of these goods, and its demand follow challenging the traditional understanding of what 
equal dignity in the context of a multinational society can mean, and what the ideal of 
authenticity, the ability to express what makes one distinct from everybody else, entails. There 
are many political demands behind this ideal, where the argument claims that indifference 
towards relevant differences constitutes an act of injustice that the traditional understanding of 
citizenship overlooks. In this liberal tradition, the recognition of our distinct identity is secured 
via abstraction to our legal status as citizens which reflects our equal dignity as compatriots. 
The recognition we need as distinct individuals to confirm our sense of self is something we 
achieve through our private relationships and partial communities. Since liberalism, in this way, 
is “fundamentally a theory about multiculturalism”9 there is no further need for the liberal state 
to concern itself with the cultural life of citizens (Taylor 1994, 38-42). 
Taylor’s views on multicultural politics is largely influenced by his personal experience with 
the French speaking province Quebec in Canada, and its demand for differential treatment by 
the federal government. French Canadians argue it is unfair for them as a distinct society to be 
subjected to the identical law of Canada, as this would subjugate them to the cultural framework 
of larger society through the state apparatus in ways that do not protect their distinct culture 
and forbids them to implement policies that protect the usage of the French language. This is 
the rationale for why sometimes, by not paying attention to the distinct nature of different 
 
9 This quote belongs to Kukathas. His objection here mirrors the same objection leveled against Taylor’s 
characterization of classical liberalism as being inhospitable to difference. He claims that the strict neutrality on 
matters of cultural or religious difference is not because liberals are inattentive to the importance culture, it is 
precisely because they recognize how important this is to people, which the history of religious and cultural 





groups, the interpretation that equality under the law is all there is to the demand of equal 
treatment, is in fact an injustice. For Taylor, French Canadian culture is taken to be a collective 
good since their way of life is not some resource they can choose to make use of, but an aspect 
of who they are and hence something they want to preserve forever.  They want to be recognized 
for what is distinct about them as a group, which for Taylor is interpreted as a collective 
irreducible dimension, as their common meaning as a nationality is only intelligible together. 
To accommodate this differentiated basis, we have further reason for why a neutral liberalism 
committed to equality and self-rule of the people must be revised (Taylor 1994, 59-60). 
For Habermas, Taylors argument is invalid since equal citizenship can in fact accommodate 
relevant differences, and hence it is wrong to characterize this model as difference-blind the 
way Taylor does. The fact that we are all equal under the law as citizens never meant that we 
treat everyone the same in the relevant respects. Many liberals argue in the same vein that 
cultural recognition is important for our identity, but that there’s no need to retreat from the 
standard model of equal citizenship where a differentiated distribution of material resources 
can accommodate their demand to proliferate their own culture. This is preferable because it 
allows the public to decide for themselves whether it is worthy to preserve the French language 
in Quebec, as the majority should not be allowed to impose this on the rest of society. If we 
stray away from this, and recognize a right to cultural survival, then we start treating cultures 
as a kind of species we need to save from extinction, when in fact cultures have always changed 
and will continue to do so on the basis of citizens own understandings (Habermas 1994,107-
115). 
But if this was all there was to it, why do the people of Quebec and Scotland insist on having 
special rights that recognize their status as a distinct culture, and should we reject it? What the 
people of Quebec are demanding is a differentiated treatment which seems to break, or at least 
offer a new interpretation of what the politics of universal dignity entails, which cannot only be 
a universal set of rights that are accorded to all citizens. To ensure cultural survival, the state 
can protect practices that affirm cultural outlooks based on cultural groupings and differentiated 
form of citizenship that grants different groups political autonomy regarding local affairs. This 
form of liberalism would uphold fundamental rights but not stretch their extension into trivial 
domains that undermine the proliferation of cultural outlooks. In the absence of such conditions, 




their distinct identity, given that the majority will always have the cultural framework needed 
to be authentic individuals. The rationale for multicultural policies is to ensure that the 
conditions of authenticity are equally distributed amongst all members of society (Taylor 1994, 
57; 1998, 154). 
However, while I think Taylor provides uncontroversial rationales for why distinct societies, 
be it Quebec, Scotland or indigenous societies, are entitled to some political autonomy from a 
larger state, especially if we couple his defense with the value of local government, 
decentralized structures of power and the caution to insist on principles of a state’s rights in the 
face of a community’s self-understanding, we should still reject the notion that there can be 
such a thing as a right to cultural survival. The nature of identity and culture is to dynamic to 
be made into some collective right. In the same way that the ideal of authenticity is not 
consistent with an overt patriotism, the concept of a collective’s right to cultural survival should 
not serve as the basis for why we recognize a distinct society like Quebec or Scotland to have 
what I think are justified arrangements for political autonomy. There’s still reason to caution 
against extending the argument into a general rule of how liberal societies ought to approach 
various forms of cultural identities.,  
7.1 The danger of cultural scripts  
Taylor recognizes that identity configures partly in relation to political societies while at the 
same time the self is too complex to be articulated into a singular symbol as there’s a diversity 
of goods and allegiances that we care about in relation to who we are and what kind of society 
we want to live. In what way can identity, and the various sources that underlie it, be politicized 
rather than unfold itself within social relationships outside political institutions? Part of 
Taylor’s motivation to reconcile social attachments and dependencies with our own unique 
identity is to grasp that our articulation is bounded by the conceptual resources in language 
which is an essentially common enterprise. This is turn depends on a community that renders 
identity intelligible. As an irreducible good, it cannot be understood via its designative features 
as it is a holistic phenomenon that over time has built interconnected meanings by which people 
understand themselves, their societies, and a form of life. To protect the identities that depend 
on a certain language, we ought to respect that language is a common good politics can be 




The struggle of self-identity depend on a framework of meaning which reflects social practices, 
while at the same time, institutions that aim to preserve the culture of which it figures might 
undermine its dynamic character when individuals come to interpret its ideals with new 
meaning. Though self-realization involves a certain understanding of one’s cultural 
embeddedness, will individual authenticity be fostered by policies that aim to protect particular 
practices? The politics of recognition, which seeks to appreciate and foster differences rather 
than equalizing them, is not easily reconciled with the ideal of authenticity. Its goal is to affirm 
the individual’s authentic way of being yet has to operate with collective categories as 
representative formulations of what the individual’s concern consists of. Collective identity 
matter for individual members, but members will always have their own interpretation of what 
it means for them in ways that cannot be articulated by others. There is a danger of essentialism 
at play, the idea that we can pick out features of what individual identity consists of, which goes 
against the fact that cultural identity is evolving. Dissecting the relationship between the 
collective and individual is difficult, as individual identity it only partially constituted by 
membership in various communities and at the same time partially constituted via ideals of 
which have nothing to do with their collective membership. These properties matter for social 
life, yet it is only collectives that can be understood as a social category (Appiah 1994, 150-
151). 
The expression of authentic form of life is often formed in opposition to social conventions and 
traditions we are embedded in, which we seek to escape, and the recognition of who we are as 
persons will be formed by these experiences as well.  The oppositional aspect of authenticity 
complicates things given that there’s complex and various components to individual identity, 
sometimes so unique that there is no way to offer collective recognition of the social category 
in ways that will not go against individuals own interpretation. The ideal of authenticity after 
all urges us to reject conventionalism of larger society, so how can it be made into a foundation 
of recognition when it is developed against various social forces? Since identity is constructed 
through social relationships, and made intelligible via public points of reference in culture, 
particular identities have various sources that transcends particular communities as we are 
partially embedded in different cultural frameworks, and identity is constructed by various 




If we agree with Taylor’s reasoning for why we should reject procedural liberalism defined as 
a uniform imposition of rights without regard for relevant differences and rejection of collective 
goals, is the reason because society has an interest in cultural survival from one generation to 
the next with particular institutions and practices? Here, this is taken not only to mean that 
culture has meaning for us today, and that distinct societies deserve differential treatment, he 
takes it to mean a continued intergenerational guarantee. Since culture is dynamic, the goal 
should rather be that individuals have the necessary resources to influence the pace of this 
change against external pressures, in order to avoid that people are coerced into practices they 
would otherwise reject. A commitment to equal dignity to all cannot allow that a particular 
conceptions of the good take precedence in all matters. In this connection, Appiah writes that 
cultural survival ought to be “consistent with respect for autonomy in the sense that if we create 
a culture that our descendants want to hold onto, our culture will survive in them” (ibid, 157-
158). 
The problem with insistence on cultural survival is when institutions create and reinforce 
cultural scripts of proper behavior, where dominant frames of reference impose themselves as 
the proper expectation of how a certain identity ought to look which might go against the 
individuals own understanding. This is the problem with minorities within a minority, the 
individuals whose identity cannot be represented by anyone else, and do not want anyone to 
tell them what it means to be a proper Catholic or a Jew. There is a danger, both with regards 
to recognition of minority cultures as well as overt forms of patriotism, where particular modes 
of behavior become connected with a certain identity, which imposes norms onto people on 
how they should live their life. Taylor’s recognition that we construct our identity in virtue of 
a story ought to caution us against the possibility that we become to connected to a certain script 
that does the job for us, rather than liberate ourselves from its expectations (ibid, 160). 
7.2 The conditions of moral reflexiveness 
When we recall Taylor’s argument that positive liberty, as an exercise concept, involves the 
quality of agency which tell us why liberal principles are valuable, we are reminded that 
negative conceptions cannot accommodate that the development of personhood has to be 
guided, interpreted and affirmed by the individuals own values. As purposeful beings, liberal 




should then ask for clarifications of how the conditions of self-realization are consistent with 
the ideal of authenticity as there is always a risk that our capacity of strong evaluation and 
recognition of what is significant is made on the basis of social conditions that are not in 
accordance with autonomy. The importance of these conditions has been articulated by 
Christman (1991) who argues that the exercise of free will depends on how we have developed 
our values. If the conditions that give rise to our perception of what is purposeful in life are 
marked by our ability to critically reflect on the social forces that affect us, rather than being 
manipulated, then this is consistent with the condition of autonomy that the exercise of freedom 
involves (ibid, 345) 
The relationship between the dialogical self and society is always strained by the demand that 
the values we affirm are genuinely our own. There is always a chance that we are not 
autonomous if the motivational sources we live by have been imposed via oppressive practices 
we might even be obliquus of. For Christman, self-government means that our attitudes are 
chosen for the right reasons where the level of autonomy is relative to how our values were 
formed. This tells us that at the time when our beliefs were formed, we were able to reflect on 
the processes that influence us and were in a position to affirm them via our own self-reflection. 
This is however a strict demand and somewhat controversial claim since some philosophers 
think it makes autonomy an impossible demand. Regardless, at its surface it does tell us that 
the relationship between the dialogical self and social life is always in tension with the demand 
that the values we affirm are genuinely our own, since there is always a chance that we are not 
autonomous if the motivational sources we live by have been imposed via oppressive practices 
unknown to ourselves. The tensions between freedom as an exercise of choosing in line with 
what is significant and the conditions of communal belonging which we depend on as strong 
evaluators is not easy to reconcile.  Community both enables and constrains this possibility 
through its moral horizon and its conformist dynamics (ibid, 345-347).  
Weinstock (1994) argues that to settle this tension we should recognize that if the common 
values of a polity cannot be reduced to social goods that enable individual pursuits of the good, 
then the polity will undermine the very conditions Taylor affirms as necessary to foster our 
capacity as moral agents. He argues that a commitment to the betterment of societies moral 
reflexiveness is best aided via a value-neutral distribution of material resource and civil rights 




organization. This is because we need to be aware of our own moral framework of evaluative 
distinctions that work as a background for the choices we make. In Taylor’s theory, this is a 
richer form of the ideal of authenticity which goes beyond the simple view that freedom is 
merely the ability to act on desires, but rather express our ability to pursue things we judge 
purposeful and express the meaning of who we are. It is only as strong evaluators we can know 
that some forms of living are worthier than others, and the reflexive awareness of the language 
we orient ourselves through conditions personhood (ibid, 185). 
Weinstock argues we are more likely to develop this reflexiveness when we interact with others 
whose judgments differ from our own. This, he thinks, speaks against policies that stifles social 
conditions where people are subjected to dominant understandings of identity that a community 
upholds. If people around us mostly share our convictions and affirmed practices, there is a 
greater chance that we will remain unaware of our own moral vocabulary. In a society without 
much diversity we are more likely to take our judgments for granted without reflecting on the 
moral field that guides us. It is only by living in witness to alternative form of living that we 
are able to reflect and evaluate our own beliefs and practices in the attempt to hold on, revise 
or abandon them on the basis of their worth. In a diverse society we can reflect on the 
background of which we make our judgments, not only because we require recognition from 
others, but also because it places us in a challenge with our own way of being as it reveals to 
us that our identity is contingent on a certain understanding that supports its worth (ibid, 186-
187) 
The process of self-conscious development requires mutual questioning that make us attune to 
reflect on the presuppositions of value that lie behind moral orientations, which moral and 
cultural diversity enables. Does recognizing this point infer Weinstocks argument that the 
conditions of mutual respect are best secured under neutral institutions? He thinks it does 
because recognition requires states of equality where all members see themselves as 
independent moral agents. To make ourselves better self-evaluators, there must be room for 
forms of life that are granted equal settings as any dominant culture. From this he argues that 
moral agency is best secured within a neutral state that in effect affirms the equal value of all 
conceptions of the good as this puts everyone  in a state of self-reflection against one’s own 





The capacity to exercise moral agency also depends on our ability to reevaluate and refine our 
judgments as we gain new understandings from social interactions and our own experience. 
Taylor’s views on practical reasoning claims that the process of continuous self-understanding 
is a process between different evaluations. If we accept some propositions, others can show us 
that we hold inconsistent views in relation to it, which prompts us in a process of altering 
beliefs. If there are some criteria both participants in a debate accepts, either side has to show 
the other the inconsistency in relation to this belief (Taylor 1989, 72).  
Weinstock thinks that if social institutions are able to support our ability to partake in this 
deliberation, they will belong to a society that refrains from imposing costs onto citizens when 
they change their mode of life in concert with their changed beliefs. In such a society the best 
arguments, not the absence of costs, is what should motivate people to perform error-reducing 
moves. If a community is based on a collective substantive good, there will be social costs on 
part of the individuals whose self-understanding is altered in opposition to the dominant culture. 
From this we can reasonably assume that the society has instituted a significant disincentive 
that will prevent rather than foster conditions needed to for citizens to be strong evaluators. 
This is why a liberal state proves its affirmation of full agency by abiding itself only to the 
distribution of material and civic liberties. Since dialogical interaction is what makes us full 
agency, government ought not to privilege one form of living above others (Weinstock 1994, 
189). 
7.3 Moderating the critics 
The prospect of securing domains that facilitate a fuller form of authenticity might be stifled 
through the imposition of cultural scripts and collective goods, but we must not exaggerate the 
consequences that follow from Taylor’s intention to provide justifications for differentiated 
citizenship in multinational societies and a sense of unity amidst differences among people. 
When Lyshaug (2004) writes that politics of recognition “encourages individuals to live as if 
by the permission of their ancestors, or leaders who claim to speak for their ancestors”, she 
does not give due acknowledgment of Taylor’s reservation that ideally, the aim of the policies 
he affirms is to provide the rationale for why a certain group ought to have some autonomy in 
regards to the common good of language while still being committed to individual liberty. It 




and culture is a good to be preserved in the face of globalization, migration and market-
pressures, is not testament to illiberal forms of politics that end up handicapping the 
fundamental significant aspirations of individuals to find meaning in their lives (ibid, 313) 
Given that culture is a dynamic phenomenon, the increased effects of globalization will give 
rise to continuous articulations of identity in line with a wide social context of various forms of 
communities that interact within and across state-borders. In order to combat the sense of loss 
that can amount from this, there will be necessary to foster a feeling of anchor amongst diverse 
selves, but this enterprise should not take on forms that are at odds with the liberty and self-
understandings of the people it concerns. Given the fact of pluralism and the plural sources of 
the self, it is hard to say exactly how the judgements of meanings that figure into a person’s 
identity can be facilitated in politics in way that fosters rather than undermines authentic forms 
of living.  
Taylor also thinks identity is politically significant because it serves as individual contributions 
into a common good founded on collective, yet differentiated, forms of human experience. It is 
in this sense that we can gain better knowledge and understand ourselves as humans best, by 
fostering mutually interchangeable forms of life that can learn and provide contributions to each 
other. Humanity at large, is only something we can know by investigating the cultural forms it 
takes. Through culture, we get an insight into how humans make use of their capacities and 
create diverse forms of life and through a ‘fusion of horizons’ we can get closer to knowing 
what the universal core of humanity is (Taylor 1994, 66).  
This is another reason why we ought to be open to forms of politics that can better help us 
understand, through various cultural interchanges, what is at the core of this condition. Though 
this would indeed be good, it is perhaps an overly optimistic view of cultural dynamics which 
go against the ugly history of human exchanges. It seems doubtful that one’s commitment to a 
particular collective identity involves a generous outreach to others in the pursuit of 
understanding. Against this we do well to remind ourselves of the fundamental intolerant 
psychology of human beings that has manifested itself throughout history. Though he is right 
that we have reached better understandings of others and ourselves through cultural 





8. Discussion: Is it time to water the liberal wine? 
Culture and identity are dynamic phenomenon’s that will always continue to change but 
recognizing this does not mean that we should dismiss the political significance they have 
towards different people. The increased effects of a globalized modernity, which on the one 
hand is a gives rise to various new communities and fluid identities across different cultures, 
we should not forget that for many people rapid changes are experienced as a sense of loss. 
Since the moral horizon of which our identity is built on provides us with a compass to orient 
ourselves in the world, there’s something to the claim that fostering cultural practices provides 
a feeling of anchor amongst diverse selves, without this meaning that common enterprises are 
at odds with liberty or the self-understanding of the people it concerns.  It is difficult to say 
exactly how the judgements of meanings that figure into a person’s identity can be facilitated 
in politics in way that fosters rather than undermines authentic forms of living. We do well to 
remind ourselves that, contrary to what Taylor often implies, liberalism is not some “magic 
bullet” that provides all the answers on how to orient ourselves in political life, but only 
provides a recipe for coexistence so long as people are able to accept that some things are 
properly private while other things are of public concern (Barry 2001, 25). 
Liberalism is however a fighting non-neutral creed because a commitment to autonomy will 
merit that certain education resources we think are valuable to teach our children in order to be 
authentic individuals. Children do not start with any values, they have to have taught them, and 
by valuing autonomy we will teach children that it is good to respect other people’s beliefs. 
These values go beyond mere respect for liberal institutions since liberal constitutionalism 
cannot be indifferent towards all conception of the good. This is why children are taught that 
in a secular democracy, religion and faith are private matters that our society affirms are 
valuable ways to accommodate diversity. While the view is not imposed, it is presented in ways 
framed around the domain understandings for why the current generation values these 
commitments, where a good education will allow people to make up their own mind and come 
to determines why traditions like this ought to be maintained. The education system will always 
be political, and there is no way to design a neutral curriculum that in some way is not involved 
in social reproduction via the affirmation of society’s collective goal of fostering liberal 





The legitimacy of the state depends on instrumental as well as expressive aspects, both of which 
reinforce each other. Democracy is supposed to be an inclusive doctrine premised on the 
promise that political sovereignty belongs to the people. Historically, democratic systems have 
expanded their own recognition of who counts as a citizen. At the same time, it has an 
exclusionary dynamic built into its own operatives that follows from its inclusive functionality. 
This paradox follows from the fact that democracy depends on social cohesion and common 
identity, which implicitly tends to exclude certain identities. Since democracy is understood as 
self-government, it needs a conception of a self, and since legitimacy is understood via the 
notion of popular sovereignty, some entity must be capable of being sovereign. There will 
however always be threshold of cohesion behind these norms. Participants must be able to 
understand and respect each other’s concerns the source behind the systems of laws that is 
meant to embody popular sovereignty lie in an inclusive sphere of deliberation. This ideal can 
fractured if some subsection of the polity feel ignored, misunderstood, or disrespected, not 
because one does not get one’s way, but because of a belief that one’s concerns are not listened 
to or considered with the respect it deserves. Such laws have no legitimacy in the eyes of the 
excluded.  (Taylor 1998, 143-144). 
Dialogical openness to other’s is an essential part of democratic legitimacy and social cohesion. 
This require reciprocal commitments among citizens, despite their differences, in virtue of a 
common bond of allegiance to the political entity. Without common consciousness there cannot 
be any confidence among minorities that their voice matters, and the troublesome task is to 
construct a common identity that supports popular sovereignty. This is why the age of empires 
gradually collapsed with the rise of democracy in Europe, and why nationalist sentiments within 
multi-national states can fragment the polity’s unity, given its own promise of popular rule by 
the people. Unlike authoritarian states, modern democracies have to inspire citizens through 
common identity and patriotism in order to sustain the polity’s need for collective commitments 
(ibid, 146-147). 
Beyond the observation that subjugated peoples seek political independence from their imperial 
overlords, or that minorities within a multi-national demand some autonomy in order to rule 
themselves, established states often tend to create their own people through institutions that 
bind them together. As an example of what this means, we can observe that the United 




nationalist sentiments of Scots, English, Welsh and Irish republicans, and the diverging 
interpretations of what it means to be British. This question was highlighted in the 2014 
referendum where Scottish people voted to remain in the union after a long national debate on 
what it meant to be Scottish or British within their union. It is plausible to assume that the 
loyalists who decided the vote had diverging sets of reasons for why they opposed the idea of 
an independent Scotland. Perhaps many of them weighed the instrumental warnings of what 
would happen to the economy above supra-nationalist arguments that invoked the common 
history and identity with the United Kingdom. The salient question of what the union is 
supposed to represent has not gone away and illustrates Taylor’s point that the project of a 
country and its people’s identity is a continuous endeavor whose stability depends on some 
mutual understanding. The impact of human identity in social life and politics is highly relevant 
to understand not only contemporary political affairs, but events of the past, and those of the 
future. Political questions will in some way, or another reflect on individual conceptions of who 
they are, what they consider good, and what it is good to be, in ways that cannot be marginalized 
to the side-lines of considerations. The impact of nationalism and religion, two powerful 
sources for how humans find meaning in the world, will continue to create tensions in the face 
of liberal promises of social unity amidst our differences. 
The various forms of right-wing populism that has made its impact and shocked the liberal 
establishment of western democracies in the last few years, as well as numerous reactionary 
regimes in the middle-east and Asia that have upped their ante to consolidate power in the face 
of democratic demands, are all symptoms of liberal naivety in the face of the cultural factors of 
identity, which tell us that liberal democracy cannot be imposed without taking into account 
the continuously evolving self-understandings of the citizens it concerns. The social grievances 
that explain various forms of political instability in the west are both economic and cultural. 
We cannot understand why people are drawn to radical forms of politics by only invoking 
economic factors, as this implicitly implies that we are rational, utility seeking actors. This does 
not encompass what motivates human beings, in our own personal and civic lives, as well as 
our participation in politics as meaning searching creatures. Populist insurgencies, despite their 
divisive and exclusionary forms, represent demands to be heard in the face of political 
alienation. The perception of those who feel radical forms of politics are viable options is that 




of reference in public discourse. The attachment some place in radical leaders cannot be reduced 
to economic distress alone, but also touch on identity. 
The same dynamics that explain the call for identity politics, the need for various forms of 
historically oppressed groups to be recognized as societies with distinct needs, are also at work 
behind the rise of right-wing populism. In part, their impact is a reaction to cosmopolitan 
liberalism, and its self-deceiving neutrality. When liberal politicians and philosopher claims to 
support no particular conceptions of the good, they are deceiving themselves in that their 
politics favor institutions that align with their urbanite, university-educated, forms of living, at 
the expense of lives that fall outsides their own characteristics. As Michael Sandel writes, the 
only way we can revitalize public discourse in the face of political turmoil is to let go of the 
strict demand of liberal neutrality. Though it is tempting because it seems to avoid the tyranny 
of the majority over the values of the minority, will guarantee religious tolerance and the firm 
basis for mutual respect it in fact is a mistake since it: 
      “ill-equips us to address the moral and cultural issues that animate the populist revolt.         
       For how is it possible to discuss the meaning of work and its role in a good life without  
      debating competing conceptions of the good life? How is it possible to think through the  
      proper relation of national and global identities without asking about the virtues such  
      identities express, and the claims they make upon us?” (Sandel 2018, 358). 
By holding onto neutrality, Sandel shares Taylor’s own insistence that questions of “meaning, 
identity and purpose” are narrowed down to questions of fairness, which fail to capture why 
citizens are willing to gamble on radical politics in the face of a liberal elite they feel humiliated 
by and alienation from. To understand these populist insurgencies, Taylor’s work on 








9. Conclusion  
In this thesis I have attempted to contextualize Taylors political philosophy within his wider 
understanding of what human nature is, and what it means to be a human agent. It is a valuable 
insight to not forget that we are motivated by the search for the significant and the purposeful, 
and that this is not something that stops being true within the field of the political world. As 
dialogical selves we depend on others to articulate who we are, and what kind of society we 
want to live in. The fact that this both conditions and constrains our liberty is a difficult topic 
to dissect, and Taylors contribution, despite its controversies, is a valuable contribution. The 
fact that citizens need some form of patriotism and cultural belonging to be anchored in the 
world, yet at the same time strives to be her own person illustrates this difficulty. Since our self-
understanding is affected as much as it is by the wider moral field should tell us that we cannot 
without controversy operate with a dual identity in political theory in order to dissect how we 
approach the relationship between individuals, state and society. Aside from the fact that Taylor 
is rightly criticized for his understanding of the liberal tradition, it is clear that both sides of the 
communitarian liberal debate often talk past each other in ways that makes it difficult to dissect 
what their differences really consists of. In Taylor we see one attempt to combine the insights 
of the two within a framework that is open to be challenged and revised considering other 
perspectives. His greatest strength, I believe, is showing why self-understanding matters for us 
to pursue our political ideals and remind ourselves of the limitations of the human subject. 
Though Kymlicka is right that ethics should not depend on what people are willing to do, which 
is why impartiality matters for us to engage in cross cultural dialogue, it is still not the case that 
we should insist on imposing what is right in the face of traditional ways of being as this often 
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